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Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers:
James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites
the Fourth Amendment
George C. Thomas III
Abstract
The Framers could not have contemplated the interpretational problems that cloud
the Fourth Amendment because police, in the modern sense, were unknown to the
Framers. Also unknown to the Framers, of course, were wiretaps, drug inter-
diction searches, thermal imagining, helicopters, and blood tests. We can infer
from the history surrounding the Fourth Amendment what the Framers hoped it
would accomplish in their time. What if the Framers could have seen the future
and known the kind of police techniques that are being used today? What kind
of Fourth Amendment would they have written with that knowledge? This article
seeks to answer this question.
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TIME  TRAVEL,  HOVERCRAFTS,  AND  THE
FRAMERS:  JAMES  MADISON  SEES  THE  FUTURE
AND  REWRITES  THE  FOURTH AMENDMENT
George C. Thomas III*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine it is August 17, 1789, and we are walking on the dirt
streets of New York City toward the Federal Hall.  Constructed over
five years beginning in 1699, the Federal Hall was chosen by the New
York City Common Council to house the new federal government.1
Congress commissioned Pierre L’Enfant to convert the building into
“an elegant meeting place for Congress.”2  When completed, the
three story building measured ninety-five feet in width and 145 feet at
its deepest point.3  A handsome building in the federal style (natu-
rally), its main entrance was on Wall Street off a covered walk that
paralleled the street.4  From the plainly appointed hall just inside the
entrance, we enter “the central three-story vestibule, which ha[s] a
marble floor and an ornamented skylight under a cupola.  Off this
vestibule [stands] the House of Representatives chamber, a two-story,
richly decorated octagonal room.”5
* Judge Alexander P. Waugh Sr. Distinguished Scholar, Rutgers University
School of Law.  Many people provided advice, encouragement, and help of all kinds.
While I cannot thank everyone by name, I must thank Tom Clancy, Morgan Cloud,
Bill Cuddihy, Tom Davies, Arnold Loewy, and Tracey Maclin.  The most valuable
assistance of all came from Paul Axel-Lute, a member of the Rutgers Law Library
faculty, who uncovered documents that I thought I would never find.
1 Diary of William Maclay (Apr. 24, 1789), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789–91, at 3, 3 n.1 (Ken-
neth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 For a drawing of the Federal Hall, courtesy of the New York Historical Society,
see First Fed. Cong. Project, Birth of the Nation: The First Federal Congress 1789–1791:
Setting Precedent, at http://www.gwu.edu/~ffcp/exhibit/p3/index.html (last visited
Feb. 21, 2005).
5 Diary of William Maclay, supra note 1, at 3 n.1.  The Federal Hall was torn
down in 1812. Id.
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In this room, the House is debating the Bill of Rights.  Represen-
tative Elbridge Gerry rises to say that his smallpox inoculation6 gave
him a high fever, during which he saw elephants on the ceiling and
then glimpsed what appeared to be the future.  I indulge this fiction
to penetrate, however imperfectly, the opaqueness of history on what
the Framers meant when they wrote the Fourth Amendment.  As Pro-
fessor Yale Kamisar has concluded, the Framers “could hardly have
been expected to foresee the current state of affairs.”7  My fiction will
permit the Framers to see the future and then to adjust their Fourth
Amendment to meet that future.
Gerry’s fevered brain contains the vision of federal police who are
always seeking to uncover criminal activity.  Gerry said it looked to
him just like the British customs officials and militia in the years
before the Revolution.  But the federal officers have developed mirac-
ulous devices that Gerry cannot understand even as he struggles to
describe them to his fellow legislators.  Federal police use hovercrafts
that suspend themselves over the homes of citizens, allowing the of-
ficers to see through cracks in the roofs.  After hovering over one
home for a time, they can move to the next.  And the next.  And the
next.  Gerry asks Representative James Madison whether the Fourth
Amendment would forbid this conduct.
Before Madison can answer, Gerry tells of another vision of the
future.  In this one, federal officers are given the task of catching
smugglers.  Because many smugglers avoid interdiction at the borders,
the officers seek to find them inside the country by targeting certain
highways and other modes of transportation for close observation.
These heavily armed officers are authorized to stop vehicles traveling
on particular roads near the border and question the occupants.
They are also authorized to stop vehicles anywhere in the country8
6 Inoculation against smallpox had been practiced in America since the early
eighteenth century.  John and Abigail Adams and their children were inoculated.
DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 142 (2001).  According to McCullough, the idea
had come from a slave belonging to Cotton Mather, an African named Onesimus,
who said the practice was long established in Africa. Id.  A small incision was made in
the healthy patient and then “pus from the ripe pustules” of a smallpox patient was
scooped into the open cut.  A generally mild case of smallpox would result, yet the
risk of death was relatively slight. Id.
7 Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis”
Rather than an “Empirical Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 571 (1983).
8 This involves a bit of hyperbole.  Police must have at least grounds to make a
traffic stop.  But the New Jersey Supreme Court commented recently that, given the
various traffic offenses, it is “virtually impossible to drive and not unwittingly commit
some infraction of our motor vehicle code.”  State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 908 (N.J.
2002).
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art25
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and seek consent to search the vehicle.  And they are authorized to
approach individuals who are on trains and buses (he would have to
explain to the Framers what trains and buses are) and ask for identifi-
cation.  While blocking the aisle in a bus or train, the officers ask to
search the persons and belongings of the passengers, all without any
suspicion that anyone is guilty of smuggling.  If the person acquiesces
in the request from the armed militiaman, his belongings can be ran-
sacked and any evidence found can be used to convict him of one of
hundreds of federal crimes.  A gasp comes from the crowd.  Yes, Gerry
informs the shocked audience, in the year 2002, the federal criminal
code will contain roughly 3500 criminal offenses and another 10,000
or so criminal prohibitions are in federal regulations.9
The final vision of Gerry’s fever-deranged mind is of a similar
force, this time under the authority of a state and named “police.”
The idea of state or city police is an alien concept that he must ex-
plain.  Then he would describe what New York City looks like in 2005,
and the audience gasps again.  The state and city militia who navigate
this unimaginable expanse of steel and concrete are looking for suspi-
cious conduct of any nature, not just related to various smuggling en-
terprises.  When they see suspicious conduct, they can seize the
individual and frisk him for weapons without probable cause to think
that he is committing a crime.  Possessing a weapon violates several
state laws, and if the state militia finds a weapon, the State can use it to
convict the suspect of one or more of these crimes.  Leaving aside the
issue of what happened to the Second Amendment, Representative
Madison, would the Fourth Amendment permit these acts of the state
militia?
What would Madison answer?
Madison might, of course, tell Gerry to go home, get some rest,
and recover from his smallpox inoculation and the horrific nightmare
of national and state militias that exist not to protect the citizens from
foreign enemies but, instead, to insinuate themselves into our homes,
our travel, and our cities.  It can never happen, Madison might say, so
long as we have a republican form of government.  The citizens will
always keep the dreaded central government, and the state govern-
ments, in check.
But Gerry tells Madison that in 2005 the citizens fear criminals
and terrorists more than they fear the government.  For the most part,
American citizens living in alien-looking places clamor for the pres-
9 Paul Rosenzweig, Heritage Found., Congress Clogs Courts with too Many Federal
Crimes, at http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed072402.cfm ( July 24,
2002).
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ence of heavily armed police and support wholeheartedly the fight
against crime and, especially, against terrorists determined to destroy
America.  While there is less support for the war on drugs, a “war” that
Gerry explains to the disbelieving audience, Congress and most of the
state legislatures are committed to that one too.  The check on gov-
ernment investigative activity, developed by the Supreme Court from
1886 to 1921,10 had largely disappeared by the middle of the twentieth
century.  There was this one moment, Gerry recounts, in the 1960s
when a liberal Supreme Court tried to stem the tide in favor of the
police, but the moment passed, the barriers put in place were too
weak, technology flourished, and privacy was lost.
Madison might wonder what happened to the common law, some
of which was enacted into federal law as early as 1789, that required
individual cause and warrants before customs officials could search
our warehouses and homes, and placed other restrictions on the
power of these officials to rummage through our belongings.  Though
customs officials could inspect and record the containers found in
ships that docked at our ports, a more thorough search required “rea-
son to suspect” that goods subject to customs duties were being con-
cealed.11  What happened to that kind of solicitude for property and
privacy?
Those of us alive in 2005 know that Gerry’s dream is all too accu-
rate.  And there is more.  Imagine a typical day.  Assume that the po-
lice have no solid evidence against you, nothing that would approach
probable cause for a search warrant or for the police to arrest you.
Perhaps they have heard a rumor or perhaps they have targeted you
because of your friends or because of your race or ethnicity.  What
follows, Mr. Madison, is the world permitted by your Fourth Amend-
ment.  It is what your handiwork has wrought.
10 This covers the period from Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), to Gouled
v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), and includes Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), and Silverthorne v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).  By the time we get to
1922, the government was forbidden to search for and seize records, papers, and doc-
uments located in a home or office even if the police had a valid search warrant.
Gouled built upon Boyd’s foundation to arrive at this rule. See Gouled, 255 U.S. at
306–13.  Moreover, Silverthorne built upon Weeks to hold that evidence seized in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, or any evidence derived from it, could not be used in
the government’s case. See Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 391–92.
11 Compare Collection Act of 1789, ch. 5, § 15, 1 Stat. 29, 40, with id. § 24, 1 Stat. at
43.
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art25
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I. SEARCH AND SEIZURE: 2005 MODEL
You call your office while eating breakfast.  The police can record
the number you dial.12  You access the weather on your computer.
The police can record what web sites you visit and how long you stay.13
You drive to the newsstand where you buy a cup of coffee.  Under-
cover police have installed a beeper in a false bottom of the cup.14
They can use this beeper to follow you on your sales route.15  If you
stop by the home of a drug dealer or a lover, the police will know that.
When you arrive at work, the numbers you dial on the phone there,
too, can be recorded.  At any time during the day or night the police
can come to your work or your home and ask for permission to
search.16  When you look over your canceled checks for your business
or home, you should know that the police can examine those in the
hands of your bank.17  If you decide to throw away old canceled
checks (or letters from a lover or gambling slips from your bookie),
you should know that the police can rummage through your garbage
when it is sitting on the curb next to your property.18
If you drive home to avoid being cornered on a bus or train, you
can be stopped at a roadblock for the police to inspect your driver’s
license and car registration or to talk to you to see if you are intoxi-
cated.19  As long as the officers do not prolong the traffic stop longer
than necessary to accomplish these purposes, they can deploy a drug-
sniffing dog to walk around your vehicle and sniff for contraband
drugs.20  If you live near the border with Mexico, you can be stopped
at a fixed roadblock by the immigration authorities.21  When you get
home, you may be surprised to discover that the authorities have used
a backhoe to dig up your entire two-acre backyard.  (They were care-
ful not to dig up your shrubs or the area adjacent to your house.)
12 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
13 This follows by necessary implication from Smith.
14 This is not a Fourth Amendment seizure. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705 (1984).
15 This is not a search. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
17 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
18 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
19 See Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (holding that
sobriety checkpoints do not violate the Fourth Amendment); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 656–57 (1979) (stating in dicta that police may stop vehicles at inspection
checkpoints as long as police do not exercise discretion in deciding what vehicles to
stop).
20 Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 838 (2005).
21 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\80-4\NDL407.txt unknown Seq: 6 12-APR-05 17:27
1456 notre dame law review [vol. 80:4
Whatever they find in this excavation can be used to prosecute you.22
At any time, police can “plant” an undercover agent in your business
or pleasure activities to spy on you and report back what you said and
did.23  They can “wire” this person so that the police can listen and
record what you say.24  The police can do all the things in this and the
previous paragraph, plus the hovercraft and the bus encounter de-
scribed earlier, without the slightest shred of suspicion.25
What say you now, Mr. Madison?
The Fourth Amendment was, in one sense, too successful.  Writ-
ten to ensure that Congress could not authorize general searches, the
second clause of the Amendment is so clear and categorical that the
Court only once has had to deploy the Amendment to strike down an
act of Congress, and even there the Court had to enlist the Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination to justify its
holding.26  The first clause is, however, phrased at a high level of ab-
straction, identifying a “right of the people in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures” and specifying that it “shall not be violated.”27  One question
left from the history of the Fourth Amendment is whether the Fram-
22 This might be a stretch of Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), depend-
ing on which of the Court’s two rationales is the principal one.  The first justification
for approving an entry onto and examination of a farm was that the Fourth Amend-
ment simply does not apply to open fields because it protects only “persons, houses,
papers, and effects.” Id. at 176.  On that reasoning, there is no reason to believe that
what is under the surface of the fields is protected.  But the Court also concluded that
a property owner would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his fields. Id.
at 179. That reasoning might create Fourth Amendment protection if the Court was
willing to hold that one can reasonably expect privacy in what one buries in an open
field.  Perhaps this is the same as saying that one would not have a Fourth Amend-
ment interest in the shape of a container placed in public but could have a Fourth
Amendment interest in the contents.
23 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
24 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion).
25 If the reader suspects that this description of Fourth Amendment protection
outrages me, she would be correct.  I am in good company. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin,
Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
723, 811 (1992) (noting that the Court’s Fourth Amendment model “allows coercive
police tactics and permits violations of personal dignity”); Scott E. Sundby, “Every-
man’s” Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1789–90 (1993) (setting out the “Accidental Tourist’s Guide to
Maintaining Privacy Against Government Surveillance,” a wonderful tongue-in-cheek
criticism of the scope of the modern Fourth Amendment).
26 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (striking down an act of Congress
that made the refusal to provide documents as demanded by the government an ad-
mission of the allegations in the demand).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art25
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ers wanted that clause to have independent significance and, if so,
what it would prohibit.  One possibility, endorsed by Professor
Thomas Davies after a careful and exhaustive review of the relevant
history, is that the first clause both defines the scope of the Fourth
Amendment and tells us that it is a fundamentally important right
that should be kept safe from general warrants.28  That business, of
course, is taken care of in the Warrant Clause.29
For decades, the modern Court read the Fourth Amendment as if
the only real issue was whether the police had to have a warrant.  This
methodology transferred meaning about what searches and seizures
are “reasonable” into a question about the need for a warrant.  This is
consistent with the notion that the real Fourth Amendment require-
ment is in the Warrant Clause and we merely need to identify the class
of searches to which that Clause applies.  If the police needed a war-
rant and did not have one, the conduct was unreasonable.  If they did
not need a warrant, the police conduct was automatically reasonable.
During that time, the Court began with the cardinal principle
that a warrantless search of a home is unconstitutional.  The Court
sought to build a warrant requirement using this principle as the base
of a logical pyramid.  So, for example, if police had to have a warrant
to search a house, what about a car parked in a driveway?30  What
about a footlocker that was placed into the trunk of a car moments
before the suspects were arrested?31  What about a box discovered
during the search of a car?32  That methodology worked pretty well,
but in the late 1960s, the Warren Court (yes, the Warren Court) be-
gan to favor a more nuanced approach that relegated the warrant “re-
quirement” to a subcategory of cases and sought to apply the
Reasonableness Clause to a large expanse of government conduct.
What the Court failed to appreciate is that, outside the warrant re-
quirement, no rules could be deduced from the requirement that a
search be reasonable.  Reasonableness lies in the eye of the beholder.
The Court’s current Fourth Amendment methodology is essentially a
balancing test with the public interest in admitting reliable evidence
of guilt on one side and the suspect’s privacy on the other.  Even the
28 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 724 (1999).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 445 (1971) (holding that a warrant
was required).
31 See Chadwick v. United States, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that a warrant was
required).
32 See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion) (stating that
a warrant was required).
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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least cynical reader will appreciate that this kind of balance will almost
always come out in favor of a narrow Fourth Amendment.  And it did,
even in the hands of the Warren Court33 and more so in the hands of
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.34  Unlike the early twentieth cen-
tury, when the Fourth Amendment protection was narrow but deep,
we now have a broad layer of Fourth Amendment protection that is as
thin as ice on a warming pond.
I seek a simplified, reformulated vision of the Fourth Amend-
ment.  I should be clear that my Article will not address the appropri-
ate remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation.  I agree with William
Cuddihy that the Amendment, by default, incorporated the English
law denying the availability of exclusion as a remedy.35  Thus, history
can tell us nothing useful on this issue, which remains a highly conten-
tious policy decision.  I will restrict myself to topics about which his-
tory might provide insight.
The method of inquiry will be to understand the common law
relevant to search and seizure and the political context in which the
Fourth Amendment was proposed and debated.  Against this back-
ground, I will propose a series of modifications based on what I think
the Framers would have said if they could have seen particular mod-
ern police methods.  Of course, my conclusions are tentative and
open to refutation.  Nonetheless, I believe some fairly solid “proof”
comes of this exercise.  Despite the impossibility of putting ourselves
truly into the minds of men who lived 220 years ago, I believe we can
recover enough of the context and politics of that time to create a
Fourth Amendment more consistent with the principles that led to its
creation.
33 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting a “stop and frisk” when
police have reasonable suspicion that a suspect was armed and dangerous and about
to commit a crime); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (upholding a conviction
even though the arrest was based on information from an unnamed informant and
the state court refused to permit the defendant to learn the identity of the
informant).
34 The Burger and Rehnquist Courts greatly expanded the Terry stop and frisk
regime that seemed limited to violent crimes about to occur. See, e.g., United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983) (stating in dicta that Terry sometimes allows tempo-
rary seizures of luggage).  Later courts also expanded the Warren Court’s search inci-
dent to arrest doctrine. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (permitting
police to search a car “incident to arrest” even though the arrestees were no longer in
or near the car).
35 3 William John Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Mean-
ing 602–1791, 1531 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate
School) (on file with UMI Dissertation Services).
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art25
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Though my “new” Fourth Amendment contains nine clauses
rather than two, my proposed reforms can be grouped under three
heads.  First, the Court’s attempt to expand the coverage of the
Fourth Amendment by restating it as protecting privacy is a failure.
We need to return to the plain meaning of “persons, houses, papers,
and effects” as those items would be understood by the Framers in the
context of modern life.  Second, the most important requirement for
searches and seizures in colonial times was cause to believe that a
crime had been committed.  The modern Court has read individual-
ized cause out of the Fourth Amendment in a variety of ways and
those doctrines should be abandoned.  Third, as a corollary of the
second principle, consent should never be permitted to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment.  My new Fourth Amendment is based mostly on
the notion of probable cause.36  As Scott Sundby has put it so well,
“probable cause must be the center of the Fourth Amendment uni-
verse.”37  I would apply that principle as follows: police may search for
and seize evidence when they have probable cause.  If they do not
36 I do not claim that the common law used the locution “probable cause” or that
a requisite level of cause played exactly the role that it does today.  The use of “proba-
ble cause” as the sole standard for warrants was Madison’s innovation.  Thomas Y.
Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions
and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 239, 370 (2002).  But this innovation made the issuance of warrants easier, not
more difficult, than under the common law.  The common law required, for an arrest
or search warrant, that a complainant make a sworn accusation that a crime had oc-
curred and that the complainant “possessed probable cause of suspicion regarding
the perpetrator’s identity.”  Davies, supra note 28, at 651–52.  Lord Hale put it this way R
when describing what the magistrate must do before issuing an arrest warrant: “to
examine upon oath the party requiring a warrant [complainant], as well whether a
felony were done, as also the causes of his suspicion.”  2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *110.  Thus to permit a warrant only on “proba-
ble cause” was a substantial lessening of the burden that government faced at com-
mon law.
When the Framers thought “search and seizure,” they almost certainly thought
“customs.”  The Fourth Amendment applied only to federal officers, and customs was
about the only duty they had that would give rise to search or arrest.  Davies specu-
lates, therefore, that the Framers wanted federal customs agents to be able to use the
“probable cause” defense to a trespass suit, permitted under English law, if the seized
goods turned out not to be subject to forfeiture.  Davies, supra, at 370.
37 Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar and
Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1133, 1138 (1998).  I do not mean to imply that Sundby
goes as far as I do.  Indeed, he contemplates “departures” from the Fourth Amend-
ment norm of probable cause. Id.  Thomas Clancy also goes almost, but not quite, as
far as I do. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 634 (1995) (concluding
that “[e]xceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion should only be justi-
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have probable cause, they may not search for or seize evidence.  Police
may arrest if they have probable cause.  If they do not have probable
cause, they may not seize a person.  To be sure, sometimes police will
also need a warrant to search or arrest, but probable cause is the
“king” of the Amendment that I will write for the Framers.  First, I
briefly describe and “locate” my methodology in the scholarly field.
II. A WORD ON METHODOLOGY
History has probably been used (and misused) more frequently
in seeking to understand the Fourth Amendment than all other crimi-
nal procedure rights combined.  Reasons to look to history when con-
struing the Fourth Amendment include the textually uncertain
meaning of a right against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and
the easily documented abuses of the British in the colonial period.
Perhaps the chief abuse was the attempt to use writs of assistance to
enforce increasingly unpopular customs laws, which contributed to
the general resentment of British power during this period.  It is fair
to say that the Court uses Fourth Amendment history when conve-
nient, dipping its toe into the waters here and there to support a deci-
sion that the Court has surely made on other grounds.  Kathryn
Urbonya’s recent analysis makes this point vividly.38  Some scholars
use the same methodology, engaging in what Morgan Cloud calls “law-
yer’s histories.”39  These histories, on Cloud’s account, “have been
partial in two ways: they have been incomplete, reviewing only a small
fraction of the relevant historical data, and they have been partisan,
selectively deploying fragments of the historical record to support
their arguments about the Amendment’s meaning.”40
Several problems attend any “reading” of Fourth Amendment his-
tory.  I ignore here, because it is not relevant to my project, the ques-
tion of whether and how history should constrain the Court.  This
deep methodological question must be addressed in any attempt to
use history to create constitutional doctrine, but my project seeks
merely to ask what Fourth Amendment the Framers might have writ-
ten could they have seen the future.  For the reader interested in the
fied by a showing of necessity, which is to say that exceptions to that requirement
should be few”).
38 Kathryn Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Supreme
Court’s Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387 (2003).
39 Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History, Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1707, 1707 (1996).
40 Id. at 1708.
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art25
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deep methodological question, no better account of it exists than
David Sklansky’s.41
The remaining problems in “reading” Fourth Amendment his-
tory have been ably articulated by Cloud, Davies, and Tracey Maclin.
First, there is the complexity of the history leading up to the Fourth
Amendment.  As Maclin puts it, the Supreme Court “mistakenly dis-
tills the Fourth Amendment’s rich and complex history” into rules.42
There were, after all, thirteen colonies, an evolving common law, and
the British abuses of their own rules.  “Common-law rules, like consti-
tutional principles, do evolve with time,” and when a common law
norm is evolving, “disagreement among common-law scholars on the
authority of a particular legal norm should be expected.”43
Even if we could isolate some clear common law rules about
search and seizure, we face daunting problems trying to “translate”
those rules into what the Framers might have intended.  To begin, the
most dominant intent of the Framers had nothing to do with the content
of the rights in the Bill of Rights.  What modern scholars often fail to take
into account is that in 1789 the Republic was in danger of falling apart
rather than uniting into a single country.  When the First Congress
took up Madison’s proposed bill of rights on June 8, 1789, only eleven
states had ratified the Constitution.  The margin of victory in the
three most populous and important states—Virginia, New York, and
Massachusetts—was less than three percent beyond a majority.44  Four
states had endorsed “plans for a second convention to dilute the pow-
ers that the federal government had obtained at Philadelphia.”45  The
extreme Antifederalists were using the lack of a bill of rights as a way
to attack the Constitution.  Thus, “Madison designed the Bill of Rights
as a wedge between the moderate and radical factions of Antifederal-
ists.”46  Moreover, Madison feared that the Antifederalists would intro-
duce their own amendments that would cripple the central
government.  Thus, the true “intent” of the Framers was to isolate the
extreme Antifederalists and to “impale[ ]” the Antifederalist move-
41 David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1739 (2000).
42 Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth
Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 971 (2002).  Maclin had in mind
the rule in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), permitting a state to
authorize a custodial arrest for any offense, but his point has general applicability.
43 Maclin, supra note 42, at 954–55. R
44 3 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 1432 & n.135. R
45 3 id. at 1429.
46 3 id. at 1437.
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ment “on the very weapon, the clamor for a bill of rights, that it had
thrust at its opponents.”47
But assume we can surmount all of those problems and gain a
glimmer of insight into what was actually going on in the minds of the
men who wrote and ratified the Fourth Amendment.  We have a final,
and ultimately insurmountable, problem, as Davies has shown with
painstaking care.  Almost nothing about the Framers’ Fourth Amend-
ment is relevant to modern policing.48  The problems the Framers
sought to remedy were eighteenth-century problems.  The problems
we face are twenty-first-century problems.  Those who seek to build a
current doctrine on a foundation of history must shape the history in
awkward if not downright perverse ways to make it fit.  It is as if one
were trying to make a jet fighter from oak timbers.
For example, the common law limited arrests and searches in
ways that would be unacceptable in the world of modern policing.
The cornerstone of common law arrest and search procedure was not
a prediction of probability that the suspect was involved in criminal
activity.  A lawful arrest or search could not occur in the absence of
proof that a crime in fact had been committed.49  A warrant required
an accusation by a named complainant that a crime had been commit-
ted.50  In effect, common law crime detection was based on an accusa-
torial system, unlike modern policing where the government can seek
out evidence of crime on its own.  The difference between these two
approaches is enormous, and I cannot imagine we are ready to return
to the common law accusatorial model of crime detection.
The approach most faithful to conventional historical methodol-
ogy is to set out the history as accurately as possible without trying to
fit the history somehow into today’s doctrine.  This is the “damn the
torpedoes” method, most effectively used by Davies51 and Cuddihy.52
Much of the Fourth Amendment scholarship ignores the central mys-
tery that Davies identifies.  The Fourth Amendment sets out with great
detail what warrants must contain and says nothing about when war-
rants must be obtained.  For decades the Court tried to fill this vac-
uum, spasmodically and without a clear pattern, as I will describe
47 3 id. at 1440.
48 See, e.g., Davies, supra note 28, at 724–41. R
49 See Davies, supra note 28, at 627–39; Davies, supra note 36, at 321–26, 368–73. R
50 See Davies, supra note 28, at 650–54.  A valid warrant also required, to be sure, a R
showing of “probable cause of suspicion regarding the perpetrator’s identity.” Id. at
651–52.  But by itself, this would have been insufficient to justify issuance of a warrant.
Id.
51 See Davies, supra note 28. R
52 See Cuddihy, supra note 35. R
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later.  Today, however, the Court has given up the game and lacks any
coherent schema for what constitutes an “unreasonable search and
seizure.”
After setting out the most exhaustive history to date of the Fourth
Amendment, Davies describes the conundrum faced by serious his-
torians: “That the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment sounds
so strange to modern ears demonstrates the degree and depth of
change that has occurred in constitutional search and seizure doc-
trine since the framing.”53  Ultimately, Davies is “skeptical . . . whether
even clear history can provide much positive guidance for shaping
specific responses to modern search and seizure issues.”54  This is be-
cause “[i]n a very real sense, the modern mystery associated with the
two-clause text of the Fourth Amendment is the product of the Fram-
ers’ inability to gauge how criminal justice institutions would actually
evolve.”55  Thus, “[a]pplying the original meaning of the language of
the Fourth Amendment in a completely changed social and institu-
tional context would subvert the purpose the Framers had in mind
when they adopted the text.”56
I agree with Davies that even the clearest history of how the Fram-
ers meant the Fourth Amendment to operate would be essentially
meaningless in today’s constitutional world.  I seek, instead, to offer
the piece of the puzzle that is missing in our Fourth Amendment uni-
verse: how would the Framers have written the Fourth Amendment if
they could have foreseen modern police methods?  To accomplish
this goal, the reader must be grounded in the Framing era and the
values held by the Framers.  This is the task of Part III.  In Part IV, I
will write the Fourth Amendment that I think the Framers would have
written if they could have seen the future.  In Part V, I will briefly
describe the Court’s alternative vision of the Fourth Amendment.
Part VI asks the reader to choose which one seems better.
III. ALFRED E. NEUMAN57 IN 1789: WHAT, ME WORRY
ABOUT SEARCHES?
The historical record is clear: the experience with British rule left
the Framers terrified of general searches.  General searches on land
53 Davies, supra note 28, at 724. R
54 Id. at 736.
55 Id. at 741.
56 Id. at 740–41.
57 A reader of a draft worried that some readers would not know Alfred E.
Neuman.  I was tempted to say, “So be it,” but caution prevailed.  He is the “poster
child” for Mad Magazine and his motto in the face of sure disaster is: “What, me
worry?”
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were typically conducted pursuant to writs of assistance.  From roughly
the middle of the seventeenth century until the Revolution, writs of
assistance had been understood to authorize British customs officers
“to enter and inspect all houses without any warrant.”58
Thomas Davies argues that the Framers used the Fourth Amend-
ment to abolish general warrants and that was all they intended the
Amendment to do.59  For my purposes, I need only show that the
Fourth Amendment was aimed principally at general warrants and
that the Framers did not think much, if at all, about other types of
searches and seizures.  This discussion leads, I believe, to the conclu-
sion that had the Framers seen the future, they would have written a
different Fourth Amendment.  I will write that Amendment for them.
The point of writing a new Fourth Amendment is to show the
failures of the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine, failures that I be-
lieve were inevitable given what the Court has to work with.  The
Fourth Amendment has detailed requirements to ensure that warrants
are specific rather than general: “[n]o Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”60  The first clause contains a vague observation that the “right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated.”61  Davies has concluded that “unreasonable” meant something
quite different to the Framers than it does to us today.  Today, it has a
relativistic meaning: roughly, conduct that is inappropriate in the par-
ticular circumstances.
But Davies believes that the Framers used “unreasonable searches
and seizures” to describe searches and seizures pursuant to general
warrants.  “Because ‘unreasonable’ was a pejorative synonym for gross
illegality or unconstitutionality, . . . the Framers would have under-
stood ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ as the pejorative label for
searches or arrests made under that most illegal pretense of author-
ity—general warrants.”62
58 2 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 759.  Cuddihy concludes that this understanding R
violated both local law and British law. Id.
59 Davies, supra note 28, at 619–68.  Kamisar and others disagree. See, e.g., R
Kamisar, supra note 7, at 574–79. R
60 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
61 Id. amend. IV.
62 Davies, supra note 28, at 693.  David Sklansky disagrees, arguing that “unrea- R
sonable . . . almost always meant in the late-eighteenth-century what it means today:
contrary to sound judgment, inappropriate, or excessive.”  Sklansky, supra note 41, at R
1780.
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art25
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\80-4\NDL407.txt unknown Seq: 15 12-APR-05 17:27
2005] time  travel,  hovercrafts,  and  the  framers 1465
Whether “unreasonable searches and seizures” included more
than general warrants, the state constitutions in place in 1791 show
that the principal concern was the general warrant.  Eight states had
constitutional provisions relating to search and seizure.63  Four men-
tion only rights against general warrants.  Virginia’s provision can
stand as an example of all four:
That general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose
offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are
grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.64
Four state constitutional provisions contain a reference to a right
to “be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his per-
son, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions,” though all four
then go on to condemn general warrants as “contrary to this right.”65
Perhaps the best way to read the four states that speak generally of a
right against search and seizure is that they reference a fundamental
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the general warrant
subset of which was forbidden by the state constitutions.
James Otis drew on an argument from “natural Equity” in his oral
argument against the writs of assistance in 1761, concluding that any
act of Parliament that ran afoul of that “natural Equity . . . would be
void.”66  Indeed, seeing the right against general warrants as a subset
of some larger fundamental right against unreasonable searches and
63 In this count, I include Vermont as a state although when it ratified its Consti-
tution in 1777 it was an independent province.  It joined the United States in 1791,
the first state to join the original thirteen. See The US50 Inc., Vermont State History, at
http://www.theus50.com/vermont/history.shtml (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).  Of the
original thirteen colonies, then, only seven had constitutions forbidding certain kinds
of search and seizure.  Four had constitutions granting rights but did not include any
rights concerning search and seizure: New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, and
Georgia.  3 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 1637.  Two, Rhode Island and Connecticut, had R
no constitutions at that time. Id.
64 VA. CONST. OF 1776, art. I, § 10.  North Carolina, Maryland, and Delaware are
similar. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 234 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
65 MASS. CONST. art. XIV.  Two other state constitutions had similar language. See
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 64, at 234–35 (citing New Hampshire and R
Pennsylvania).  Vermont had a similar provision in its 1777 Constitution.  See supra
note 63 for the status of Vermont in 1777. R
66 See John Adams’s Report of the First Argument in February, 1761, in QUINCY’S
MASSACHUSETTS REPORTS 474 (Samuel M. Quincy ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co.
1865) (quoting Otis’s oral argument: “[A]n act against natural Equity Is void: and if
an Act of Parliment should be made, in the very Words of this Petition, it would be
void”).
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seizures is a plausible interpretation of Madison’s original formulation
of the Fourth Amendment:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their
houses, their papers, and their other property from all unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not
particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or
things to be seized.67
The Amendment as adopted, of course, has two clauses rather than
one—“shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue.”  The one
clause construction—“shall not be violated by warrants issued”—sug-
gests that there is a larger right, which would be violated by general
warrants.  Thus, general warrants are forbidden, whatever else might
be contained in the larger right to be free of unreasonable searches
and seizures.  To be sure, Madison’s locution was changed to the form
we have today, with two independent clauses joined by “and,” and was
ratified in that form.  But the evidence we have suggests that the
change was intended to make the ban on general warrants stronger
rather than to create a free-standing protection in the first clause.68
Other types of searches would have concerned the Framers, one
of which is resolved by implications from the Warrant Clause.  The law
was evolving to condemn various kinds of general searches without
warrants.69  A particular kind of general search was the slave patrols
authorized by some of the Southern states.70  It would, as Kamisar has
noted, make little sense to bar searches conducted under general war-
rants and then to permit general searches to be made without
warrants.71
Moreover, Cloud pointed out to me that if the Framers intended
only to prevent the problems that the British had caused, they would
have barred writs of assistance.72  Writs of assistance were at least as
67 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
68 The argument against Madison’s language was that “by warrants issued” was
not a “sufficient” ban against general warrants.  Diary of William Maclay, supra note 1, R
at 1291.  The motion “therefore proposed to alter it so as to read ‘and no warrant
shall issue.’” Id.
69 See 3 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 1375 (noting criticism of general searches R
without warrants); 3 id. at 1402 (remarking on the increasing condemnation of gen-
eral excise searches and search warrants issued groundlessly).
70 2 id. at 1150 (noting authorization in Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia).
71 See Kamisar, supra note 7, at 575 (arguing that the “colonists would have vigor- R
ously opposed warrantless searches exhibiting the same characteristics as general war-
rants and writs and thus impairing privacy and freedom to the same degree”).
72 Attachment to e-mail from Morgan Cloud to George C. Thomas, III (Dec. 20,
2004, 5:11 PM EST) (on file with the author).
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great a problem as general search warrants in the years leading up to
the Revolution,73 yet the Fourth Amendment makes no mention of
them.  It would be bizarre to read the Fourth Amendment not to bar
writs of assistance.  Thus, I am happy to concede that “unreasonable
searches and seizures” included any type of general search, whether
by warrant or not.
At least four other potential search issues existed in the pre-Fram-
ing days.  Concerns were raised with unannounced searches and noc-
turnal searches,74 as well as official entries into homes without
announcing the official business that justified the entry.75  In addi-
tion, though there is no evidence of concern on the part of the Fram-
ers, searches incident to arrest were a type of search that existed at
that time.  Could the Framers have intended the answers to these
questions to be found in the concept of “unreasonable searches and
seizures”?  Of course.  Did the Framers intend the answers to these
issues to be found in that language?  I doubt it.  I think it far more
likely that the Framers intended “unreasonable searches and seizures”
to be a rhetorical weapon that could be used to help work out answers
to questions outside the general search category.76
From all of this, I infer that the Framers wrote the following
Amendment, which I have rephrased in modern style:
The people have a fundamental right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.  To keep the federal government from infringing that
right, no general searches shall occur and warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
If this is the right reading of history, we search that history in vain for
a meaning of “unreasonable” that extends beyond the condemnation
of general searches.
But why would that be the exclusive focus of men who were very
suspicious of the new central government?  Why not have a more gen-
73 See M. A. SMITH, WRITS OF ASSISTANCE 17–40 (1978).
74 3 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 1344–46; see also 2 id. at 1169 (stating concern R
with searches at night).
75 2 id. at 1169.
76 I don’t have a fully developed theory about what institutions or actors the
Framers would have wanted to work out the details of “unreasonable searches and
seizures.”  The most obvious candidate to us today is the courts.  I think that is the one
institution the Framers would not have wanted to infuse meaning into “unreasonable
searches and seizures.”  As this is outside the scope of this Article, I’ll keep my
thoughts on it to myself until my next article!
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eral protection of privacy?  The answer here is that, like all of us, the
Framers were a product of their times.  The nature of eighteenth-cen-
tury crime and policing did not produce much in the way of searches
without warrants.  And the first clause of the Amendment created a
powerful rhetorical weapon that could be brought to bear on searches
and seizures outside the context of general searches.
The Framers would not have known the “police” that we have
today.  “Constables were expected to preserve order by keeping an eye
on taverns, controlling drunks, apprehending vagrants, and respond-
ing to ‘affrays’ (fights) and other disturbances—but they were not oth-
erwise expected to investigate crime.”77  To supplement the
constables, most cities employed the nightwatch.  Designed to disrupt
ongoing crimes and prevent crimes about to happen, the
nightwatches in New York City, for example, were sometimes
composed entirely of civilians forced either to take their regular
turn as watchmen or pay for a substitute to replace them.  At other
times, especially during wars, the militia took over the watch.  At still
other times, a paid constables’ watch was used or citizens themselves
were paid to guard the city.78
But these night watchmen “did not have police powers and could ar-
rest with impunity only if a crime were committed before their eyes or
if they were acting under the direction of a [constable].”79
A paramilitary operation designed to keep the streets safe at
night is a world removed from proactive policing designed to solve
crimes that are already complete.  What was the colonial approach to
completed crimes?  The answer was that for the most part citizens ini-
tiated criminal prosecutions.  Putting aside for the moment homicides
and the crimes that threatened the social or economic order—for ex-
ample, riot, treason, and counterfeiting80—“the initiation of arrests
and searches commenced when a crime victim either raised the ‘hue
and cry’ or made a sworn complaint.”81  The difference between these
77 Davies, supra note 28, at 621–22. R
78 Douglas Greenberg, The Effectiveness of Law Enforcement in Eighteenth-Century New
York, in 1 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 264, 266 (Eric H. Monkkonen ed.,
1991).
79 JAMES RICHARDSON, THE NEW YORK POLICE, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1901, at 18
(1970).  Richardson used “police officer” where I substituted “constable.”  “Police of-
ficer” is confusing because Richardson does not mean a modern proactive police of-
ficer.  He uses “police officer” interchangeably with “peace officer,” by which he
means marshals and constables.
80 See infra notes 105–107 and accompanying text for a discussion of these R
crimes.
81 Davies, supra note 28, at 622. R
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approaches to completed crimes and modern policing, as I shall ex-
plain, is that colonial crime-solving would not be helped by warrant-
less searches other than the search incident to arrest, and there is at
least some doubt that searches incident to arrest occurred routinely.82
The hue and cry was an ancient common law process that obli-
gated anyone who knew of a completed felony to raise the hue and cry
“with horn and with voice” to put the village on notice of the felony.83
Then “they that keep the town” (all able-bodied men) shall follow
“from town to town, and from county to county” until the felon “be
taken and delivered to the sheriff.”84  The hue and cry dates back to
Edward I (around 1300) and evolved over the centuries into a more
elaborate process.  A statute during Elizabeth’s reign required that it
be conducted “with both horsemen and footmen.”85  A later statute
made a village liable for a fine (to being “amerced according to the
law of Alfred”) upon a constable or “like officer refusing or neglecting
to make hue and cry.”86
In the eighteenth century, the “hue and cry” was the major instru-
ment of police protection in New York City and in the other major
cities of Europe and America.87  One advantage to the hue and cry
was that it gave constables “the same powers, protection, and indemni-
fication, as if acting under the warrant of a justice of the peace.”88  So
warrantless arrests undoubtedly occurred as a consequence of the hue
and cry, and perhaps the Constable would search the suspect to dis-
arm him, but constables had no incentive to make any other kind of
search.  As Thomas Clancy concludes: “Law enforcement officials in
America and in England in the period preceding the American
Revolution did not have broad inherent authority to search and seize;
such actions required authorization, and the warrant system was used
primarily to confer that authority.”89
The Justice of the Peace could issue a “hue and cry” warrant,90
apparently for cases where fresh pursuit was no longer possible.  An
early example (1716–1717) is a New York hue and cry warrant
82 See infra note 121 and accompanying text. R
83 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *290.
84 Id.
85 Id. at *291 (citing An Act for the Followinge of Huye and Crye, 27 Eliz., c. 13
(Eng.)).
86 Id. (citing An Act for the Amendment of the Law Relating to Actions on the
Statute of Hue and Cry, 8 Geo. 2, c. 16 (Eng.)).
87 Greenberg, supra note 78, at 266. R
88 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at *291. R
89 Clancy, supra note 37, at 490–91. R
90 JULIUS GOEBEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL
NEW YORK 420–21 (1944); 2 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 1143–45. R
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presented by a mother for the murder of her bastard child.91  Between
1767 and 1775, “six typical Virginia warrants ordered peace officers to
search diligently for a horse thief, fugitive servants and slaves, a coun-
terfeiter, a murderer, and a jailbreaker.”92  The records in New York
indicate that the hue and cry warrant was not used very often,93 but
the “ancient practice of [warrantless] actual hot pursuit persisted.”94
Another form of search when fresh pursuit was not possible was
the search for escaped prisoners.  This search could be authorized by
legislative bodies.  For example, on December 30, 1776, the Continen-
tal Congress requested Baltimore County “to direct immediate and
strict search for the prisoners, who last night escaped from the gaol in
Baltimore.”95  These searches, like the hue and cry, were searches for
people, not for evidence.  And these searches all took place as a reac-
tion to a crime or escape that had occurred in public rather than, as is
often the case today, in trying to solve a crime or build a case.
The closest to modern police officers were the constables and
marshals.  They exercised “the common law duties and powers” in-
volved with enforcing the criminal law.96  Moreover, unlike the night
watchmen, whose sole duty was to keep the peace, constables and mar-
shals were also charged with being “‘vigilant in detecting and bringing
to justice all Murderers, Robbers, Thieves and other Criminals.’”97
It is important to distinguish between searching for robbers,
thieves, and escaped prisoners, all of which the Framers would have
endorsed,98 and the writs of assistance that precipitated the Fourth
Amendment.  To be sure, the hue and cry warrant had some of the
attributes of general warrants in that the authorities could search
wherever the felon might be hiding, though the treatises of the time
“frequently advised against forcible entry unless the suspect was in-
side.”99  But a general search for a horse thief, a murderer, or a jail
91 GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 90, at 420 n.202. R
92 2 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 1144. R
93 GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 90, at 420. R
94 Id. at 420 n.202.  How and how often (if at all) the hue and cry was used in late-
eighteenth-century America is not well understood, but it appears to have been re-
served primarily as a response to “fresh” crimes, especially robbery and escapes.
95 7 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 1052 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., Gov’t Printing Office 1906) (1777).
96 RICHARDSON, supra note 79, at 17. R
97 Id. at 18 (quoting SIDNEY POMERANTZ, NEW YORK: AN AMERICAN CITY,
1783–1803, at 302–03 (1938)).
98 See Kamisar, supra note 7, at 572 (noting that arrest and “arrest searches” pur- R
suant to hot pursuit, the hue and cry, and arrest warrants “did not trouble the
framers”).
99 2 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 1143. R
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breaker was designed to protect public safety, making the threat to
privacy more justifiable.  Moreover, a search for a particular individ-
ual, general though it may be in some sense, is not nearly as destruc-
tive of privacy as the writs of assistance used to enter and inspect any
house, or general warrants instructing officers to look not for particu-
lar felons or even for evidence of a particular crime, but more gener-
ally to suppress crimes.  Cuddihy uncovered “[w]arrants, orders, and
executive proclamations in New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and South
Carolina” issued in the period from 1766 to 1773 that “told enforcers
to ‘make Search’ or to ‘make diligent Search’ to suppress counterfeit-
ing, arson, and insurrection.”100  These warrants were condemned
and abolished by the Warrant Clause.  By comparison, the hue and cry
arrest was either on hot pursuit or pursuant to a warrant.  The Fram-
ers would not have thought this practice to be threatening to liberty
and would not have intended to regulate it in the Fourth Amend-
ment.  Why regulate a process that is proceeding in an acceptable
manner?
Another way a citizen could initiate the criminal process in the
eighteenth century was by filing a complaint with a local justice of the
peace.  The Justice of the Peace could issue arrest and search war-
rants, to be served by the Constable or Marshal.101  These warrants
were typically (though not always) specific in nature.102  When war-
rants authorized the Constable or Marshal to arrest a particular indi-
vidual or search a particular place, the Framers would not have
objected.103  When the warrants were general in nature, the Warrant
Clause took care of that problem.
And what of homicides and the crimes that threatened govern-
ment—riot, treason, and counterfeiting?  Homicides were not likely
to be discovered by the hue and cry, nor was there a victim to prose-
cute.  The answer, then as now, is that homicides could be “inquired
into by a coroner’s inquest or grand jury.”104
The prosecution of crimes that threatened the social order was by
government rather than citizens.  Though treason prosecutions were
100 2 id. at 1144–45.
101 See Davies, supra note 28, at 623. R
102 For an example of a magistrate-issued search warrant that was general, see 2
Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 1142 (noting a warrant that ordered “every constable in R
Princess Anne County to ‘search every Suspected House’ in his district that he or
Dunbar [the owner of stolen wheat] thought ‘convenient to search’”).
103 Cuddihy demonstrates an unmistakable trend away from general warrants and
toward specific between 1776 and 1787. See 3 id. at 1298–341.
104 Davies, supra note 28, at 622. R
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rare in colonial America,105 prosecutions for riot and counterfeiting
were common.  No evidence exists of warrantless searches for evi-
dence of these crimes, but general warrants were used to some extent
in colonial America, as we saw a moment ago with the “[w]arrants,
orders, and executive proclamations . . . to ‘make diligent Search’ to
suppress counterfeiting, arson, and insurrection.”106  More tightly fo-
cused on counterfeiting was a 1764 Connecticut warrant that ordered
“‘diligent Search in all places’ where the informant and the New Ha-
ven County Sheriff suspected that counterfeit coins or the machinery
for manufacturing them might be found.”107  But the prohibition
against general warrants in the Fourth Amendment took care of the
problems presented by these warrants and orders.
In sum, the Warrant Clause took care of almost all search and
seizure problems that the Framers could envision.  As long as the Con-
stable had a specific warrant to arrest or search, the Framers would
not have objected.  As long as an arrest was made by the hue and cry
in hot pursuit, the Framers would not have cared.  Did peace officers
make arrests outside the hue and cry and without a warrant?  The an-
swer, while not completely clear, is probably not very many.  Others
have noted that the common law created a major disincentive to mak-
ing arrests without a warrant.  In colonial times, “the officer arrested
without a warrant at his peril because if a felony had, in fact, not been
committed, he would be liable in fact to the arrested person” regard-
less of the quantum of evidence that supported the arrest.108  In En-
gland, the King’s Bench changed the rule in 1780 to provide that the
officer was not liable in damages if he made a warrantless arrest based
on a charge of felony made by another person.109  The strict liability
rule continued for night watchmen and citizens who made arrests pur-
suant to the hue and cry.
It is not clear when the English change in the strict liability rule
first appeared in the United States.  I could find no evidence of it
prior to an 1829 New York case that approved the change.110  An 1814
Pennsylvania case still stated the rule as an officer arrested at his
105 See JAMES WILLIARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES 82
(1945).
106 2 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 1144–45. R
107 2 id. at 1145.
108 Joseph J. Stengel, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, 3 U. RICH. L. REV. 278, 290 n.66 (1969) (citing Samuel v. Payne, 99 Eng.
Rep. 230 (K.B. 1780)).
109 Samuel v. Payne, 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B. 1780).
110 See Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend. 350 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829).
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peril.111  In any event, the experience of the constable or marshal on
the ground would not likely have been changed by the new rule from
England.
A pragmatic disincentive to illegal arrests existed alongside the
one created by the common law tort liability.  What has escaped the
attention of most legal historiographies to date is the political and
personal risks that constables ran when serving warrants.  At least in
New York, the social fabric during the eighteenth century was frayed
and sometimes close to tearing.  Rather than too much “law,” the colo-
nists had too little.  The law was often not enforced because the state
lacked the capacity or the will to confront lawbreakers.  Constables
were often “assaulted and resisted when they attempted to make an
arrest.”112  Over seventy percent of the eighteenth-century cases of
contempt of authority collected by historian Douglas Greenberg “in-
volved attacks by citizens on officers of the law.”113
Though “it is still difficult to explain the frequency of these at-
tacks on law enforcement,” likely reasons include that the constabu-
lary was largely drawn from artisans and tradesmen with no training in
being a peace officer.114  At times, New York was unable to fill posi-
tions with anyone, qualified or not.  “For example, two prisoners who
had been sentenced to hang on January 18, 1762, were reprieved until
February 19 because ‘the sheriff cannot find any person to act as
hangman.’”115  The prisoners were hung only when “a party of his
Majesty’s Forces” was called out “to guard the Sheriff and Civil Of-
ficers against any Insult.”116  When the Attorney General of New York
was faced in 1765 with mobs of up to 200 people ousting families from
their homes in Duchess County, he “found that it was simply too diffi-
cult to arrest 200 men—or even ten.  Indeed, it was dangerous
enough to apprehend just one offender.  New York society in the
eighteenth century simply lacked the resources to resist such
disorder.”117
Moreover, “respect for authority of government seems often to
have been lacking.”118  The most intriguing reason offered by Green-
berg to explain the difficulty of enforcing the law is the existence of a
“‘common Error generally prevailing among the Lower Class of Man-
111 See Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 315, 317–18 (Pa. 1814).
112 Greenberg, supra note 78, at 267. R
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 271 (quoting New York State Library, Mss., XC. 66 (Jan. 18, 1762)).
116 Id. (quoting New York State Library, Mss., XC. 66 (Jan. 18, 1762)).
117 Id. at 268.
118 Id. at 267.
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kind in this part of the world that after warning the Officer to desist
and bidding him to stand off at his Peril, it was lawful to oppose him
by any means to prevent the arrest.’”119  Peace officers who faced an-
gry suspects willing to oppose their arrest by any means could not have
been eager to make many arrests.
It is difficult for us in the twenty-first century to appreciate this
kind of social disorder.  Outside the context of general warrants and
writs of assistance, taken care of in the Warrant Clause, the Framers
would have had no conception of aggressive policing.  They simply
had no template in their heads for officers of the law going out on
their own to seek evidence of crime or even aggressively to arrest ordi-
nary criminals.  To the extent the New York experience can be gener-
alized,120 the Framers would likely have wished for more policing, not
less, as long as it was done by local (not federal) officers and was di-
rected at robbers and thieves.
And what of searches incident to arrest?  Cuddihy concludes: “An-
yone arrested [in the colonial era] could expect that not only his sur-
face clothing but his body, luggage, and saddlebags would be
searched and, perhaps, his shoes, socks, and mouth as well.”121  The
only authorities he cites for this proposition are letters, memoranda,
depositions, and newspaper accounts.  Perhaps the proposition was so
well accepted that it was simply not raised in cases.  It seems to me that
the reluctance to make arrests would also cause a reluctance to search
the arrestee beyond what was necessary to disarm him.  Perhaps the
news accounts and correspondence found by Cuddihy describe not a
routine practice but something so unusual it merited mention.  Of-
ficers who were afraid to arrest might want to keep their hands out of
the mouths of arrestees.  Whether or not search incident to arrest was
a routine practice, it was not controversial and was therefore unlikely
to be in the minds of the men who wrote the Fourth Amendment.
From this evidence, I conclude that when writing the Fourth
Amendment, the Framers would not have worried about warrantless
arrests and searches for evidence of “ordinary” crime.  What they did
think about were the searches and seizures that the British had used
to enforce the customs laws.  The Framers took care of that problem
with the Warrant Clause.  But on the reasonably safe bet that the
119 Id. at 267–68 (quoting from the pardon of James Wilkes, presumably written by
the Governor of the Colony of New York, Sir Charles Hardy 163 (Feb. 5, 1756) (New
York State Library Manuscript Collections, vol. 82)).
120 Historians suggest that New York was more lawless than most other colonies
because of its “factiousness” and “turbulent” society and politics.  Greenberg, supra
note 78, at 279. R
121 2 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 847–48. R
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Framers would have created protection against some types of aggres-
sive policing if they could have seen the future, we can examine the
context of the passage of the Fourth Amendment and some of the
remarks made by the Antifederalists.  I will then seek answers to the
questions I posed in the beginning about what the Framers might
have said if they could have seen the future.
IV. WHAT ALFRED E. NEUMAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN WORRYING
ABOUT IN 1789
While fighting to keep the Constitution from being ratified, the
Antifederalists often turned their rhetorical guns on the lack of a bill
of rights that would restrain the powerful federal government.  As
noted earlier, at least some of the Antifederalists did not want a bill of
rights at all.  They wanted to defeat the ratification of the Constitu-
tion; when that failed they sought to undo it.  In one sense the ex-
treme Antifederalists are the worst source we could find for the intent
of the Framers.  Yet the Antifederalists naturally looked for the most
powerful rhetorical weapons they could find.  They sought to voice
the greatest fears of the colonists.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that those fears would have moved the Framers to write a different
amendment if they could have seen the future.
One strand of Antifederalist attitude toward the new government
can be discerned from remarks made at the Virginia state convention
considering ratification of the Constitution.  George Mason, on June
11, 1788, made antitax remarks in the Virginia ratifying convention
that included the following prediction about excise taxes: “[T]his will
carry the exciseman to every farmer’s house, who distils a little brandy,
where he may search and ransack as he pleases.”122  Patrick Henry
amplified on the concern about the excisemen: “Suppose an excise-
man will demand leave to enter your cellar, or house, by virtue of his
office; perhaps he may call on the [federal] militia to enable him to
go.”123  On another occasion, Henry warned of federal sheriffs who
may “ruin you by impunity” by “sucking your blood by speculations,
commissions, and fees. . . . Thus, thousands of people will be most
122 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADEL-
PHIA IN 1787, at 265 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co.
1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (reporting George Mason’s June 11, 1788, re-
marks at the Virginia ratification convention).
123 3 id. at 412 (reporting Patrick Henry’s June 11, 1788, remarks at the Virginia
ratification convention).
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shamefully robbed.”124  In Henry’s view, without some constitutional
limit on federal searches, general warrants would be authorized, and
consequently
any man may be seized, any property may be taken, in the most
arbitrary manner, without any evidence or reason.  Every thing the
most sacred may be searched and ransacked by the strong hand of
power.  We have infinitely more reason to dread general warrants
here than they have in England, because there, if a person be con-
fined, liberty may be quickly obtained by the writ of habeas corpus.125
In another speech, Henry articulated the same concerns in an
even more colorful manner.  Without a Bill of Rights, he argued:
The officers of Congress may come upon you now, fortified with all
the terrors of paramount federal authority.  Excisemen may come in
multitudes; for the limitation of their numbers no man knows.
They may, unless the general government be restrained by a bill of
rights, or some similar restriction, go into cellars and rooms, and
search, ransack, and measure, every thing you eat, drink, and
wear.126
Among other inferences one can draw from Henry’s speech, his dis-
taste for federal customs agents is almost palpable!
An unnamed Antifederalist went further, calling excisemen the
“scruf [sic] and refuse” of mankind who would not hesitate to search
the petticoats of women.127  Mercy Otis Warren, the sister of James
Otis, wrote a pamphlet condemning general searches as a “detestable
instrument of arbitrary power.”128  Another Antifederalist warned of
124 3 id. at 57 (reporting Patrick Henry’s June 5, 1788, remarks at the Virginia
ratification convention).
125 3 id. at 588 (reporting Patrick Henry’s June 24, 1788, remarks at the Virginia
ratification convention).  I found puzzling Henry’s argument that Americans should
fear general warrants more because in England liberty could be “quickly obtained” by
writ of habeas corpus.  Habeas corpus was also part of American common law and is
recognized in Article I, section 9 of the Constitution.  Tom Davies suggested that the
explanation could be found in the word “quickly”—the frontier nature of much of
America meant that a judge who had the power to grant a writ of habeas corpus might
be a long distance from the place of confinement.  E-mail from Tom Davies to George
C. Thomas III (March 15, 2005 1:12 PM EST) (available from author).
126 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 122, at 448–49 (reporting Patrick Henry’s June R
14, 1788, remarks at the Virginia ratification convention).
127 3 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 1375–76 (quoting An Essay by a Farmer and Planter, R
MARYLAND J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, Apr. 1, 1788, at 2).
128 3 id. at 1374 (quoting MERCY OTIS WARREN, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW CONSTI-
TUTION BY A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT § 14, at 12 (1788), reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 270, 278 (Herbert Storing ed., 1981)).
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“the insolence of office” and “daring brutality” of the publican.129  “A
Son of Liberty” worried that “our bed-chambers” would be “searched by
the brutal tools of power” when the excisemen went about their
business.130
The Antifederalist concern was the power to search “by virtue of
office” backed by the power of the federal government.  In the 1789
and 1790 Collection Acts, Congress both empowered and restrained
the dreaded “excisemen.”  Congress gave customs officers the “full
power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall
have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty
shall be concealed.”131  The same section provided that with “cause to
suspect a concealment thereof, in any particular dwelling-house, store,
building, or other such place,” customs officers “shall, upon applica-
tion on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a
warrant to enter such house, store, or other place (in the day time
only) and there to search for such goods.”132  In this statute, the Fram-
ers envisioned searches requiring in all cases a “reason to suspect” or
“cause to suspect,” and when the cause focused on structures on land,
a warrant was required.  Moreover, the statute included the common
law requirement that a home could be searched only during the
daytime.
To be sure, both Collection Acts also permitted the routine in-
spection of the contents of ships that docked at a port.  The point to
these inspections was to ensure that duties were collected.  The in-
spectors’ task included “specifying the marks and numbers of each
package, and a description thereof.”133  As soon as the ship was un-
loaded, within fifteen days of docking, the customs official was re-
quired to compare the record of the goods taken off the ship with the
manifest he had created onboard the ship,134 the purpose being of
course to keep goods from disappearing from the hold of the ship
while she was in port.  But to note this suspicionless inspection
129 3 id. at 1375.
130 3 id. at 1377 (quoting A Son of Liberty, N.Y. J. & WKLY. REG., Nov. 8, 1787, at 3).
131 Collection Act of 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (repealed by Act of Aug. 4,
1790, ch. 35, § 74, 1 Stat. 145, 178) (emphasis added).  The analogous provision of
the Collection Act of 1790 is found at Collection Act of 1790, ch. 35, § 48, 1 Stat. 145,
170 (repealed by Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 112, 1 Stat. 627, 704).  Beyond one
additional comma in the Act of 1790, and spelling “day time” as two words rather than
one, the only difference is that the latter Act omitted the “or affirmation” from the
warrant application procedure.
132 Collection Act of 1789 § 24, 1 Stat. at 43.
133 Id. § 15, 1 Stat. at 40.
134 Id., 1 Stat. at 40.
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scheme is merely to say that customs searches were sui generis in 1789
as they are today.
Four principles emerge from this history.  First, the Framers
feared that government actors would abuse their office to force com-
pliance with searches.  Second, the Framers believed that searches
(other than routine customs inspections) required individualized
cause or suspicion.  Third, searches of structures required a warrant.
Fourth, the Framers embraced at least some of the common law—for
example, the daytime requirement for searches of structures.
If these principles are fairly deduced from the Fourth Amend-
ment’s history, then we can write the Fourth Amendment that the
Framers would have written if they had known that the future prob-
lem with searches would not be general searches, but rather countless
warrantless searches sanctioned by a twentieth-century Court that had
no coherent theory of the Amendment.  Unlike the “real” Fourth
Amendment, which is elegant and opaque, my “new” amendment is
nonelegant (clunky might be the best word) but seeks to provide clear
norms.
[1] The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, written communications, and personal property, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated [2] by War-
rants issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation from a named person, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized; [3]
other than searches incident to arrest, no search shall be conducted
on less than probable cause to believe that the search will produce
evidence of crime; [4] warrants are required for searches of a struc-
ture, except as permitted in [9], or of the inside of the human body,
but are not required for any other searches; [5] searches of struc-
tures and arrests inside a structure shall occur in the daytime and
pursuant to notice to occupants, unless to give notice would expose
the officer to grave danger; [6] property may be seized only when
discovered during a lawful search and when police have probable
cause to believe that it is evidence of a crime; [7] no arrests or other
seizure of the person shall be made on less than probable cause; [8]
warrants are required for all arrests in the home unless the arrest is
made in hot pursuit or to protect life or property; and [9] all arrests
permit the arresting officer to search the arrestee and the area of
his immediate control.
Clause [1] sets out a slightly altered version of the first clause of
the Framers’ Fourth Amendment.  I think “papers” in its modern
form includes all forms of written communication, but I added “writ-
ten communications” to be clear.  I used “personal property” rather
than “effects” to make clear what I think the history shows: the Fram-
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art25
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ers did not intend to bestow Fourth Amendment protection on real
property. Oliver v. United States135 gets this aspect of Fourth Amend-
ment history right, in my view.
Though the risk of Congress or a state authorizing general war-
rants, or a magistrate issuing one, is pretty low, no reason suggests
ignoring the risk.  Moreover, the specific requirements for warrants in
clause136 [2] provide helpful guidance to courts in evaluating war-
rants.  My clause [2] is the Framers’ language, with one important
change.  I required that the oath or affirmation supporting the war-
rant application come “from a named person,” thus superseding one
of the Warren Court’s worst opinions, McCray v. Illinois.137  The effect
of McCray is to permit “confidential reliable sources,” whose identity
never need be revealed, to serve as the sole basis for issuing a war-
rant.138  If the law of search and seizure permits warrants to be based
on sources who may very well be fictitious, there is little reason to
require warrants at all.  More importantly, my working assumption in
this Article is to follow history as closely as feasible given the modern
world of technology and policing.  In the “confidential source” con-
text, history tells a very clear story, as I will make plain later.
Clause [3] has a single requirement that addresses the first two
concerns manifest in the history of the Fourth Amendment.  By re-
quiring probable cause to make a search, the harm of suspicionless
searches is avoided and the risk that officials will abuse their power to
achieve compliance by coercion or trickery is minimized.  If the of-
ficer has probable cause to search, then he need not force acquies-
cence to his authority.  He has the right to make the search.
Clause [4] is roughly the Court’s current warrant requirement
and is consistent with the common law that the Framers knew.  The
Framers were likely unaware of searches of the interior of the human
body, but if they thought structures could be searched only by war-
rant, it follows that they would have felt the same way about our body
cavities—with the possible exception of the mouth during searches
incident to arrest.139  Unlike the Fourth Amendment that Madison
wrote, clause [4] makes clear that warrants are not required for
135 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
136 As a former high school and college English teacher, I am compelled to note
that “clause” [2] is actually a phrase because it lacks a subject and predicate.  I trust
the reader will forgive my referring to it as “clause” in the text for sake of symmetry.
137 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
138 Id. at 311.
139 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. R
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searches outside the house,140 an area of the law that has been in flux
for the last twenty-five years.
Clause [5] contains a daytime and notice requirement for execu-
tion of warrants to search structures.  These are the least important
rights in my “new” Fourth Amendment.  But the notice requirement
was well established at common law, and the First Congress saw fit to
include the daytime requirement in the first customs search law.  Both
seem salutary and unlikely to create many problems for courts,
though the question of how much notice to give, in terms of time, is
far from self-defining.141  Whether these rights create substantial
problems for police I will take up below.
Clause [6] restates the modern Court’s rule about seizure of
property discovered during a lawful search.  Police do not need a war-
rant to seize property if the search is lawful and they have probable
cause to believe that the property is evidence of a crime.  This makes
good sense and here I simply adopt the Court’s doctrine.
Clause [7] embodies the common law that individualized cause is
needed to arrest.  I added “or other seizure of the person” to make
clear that the Amendment should apply to more than formal arrests.
It is possible that temporary seizures as part of the nightwatch were
permissible at common law.  But as I shall argue shortly, at least some
common law sources suggest that as much individualized cause was
needed for seizures of “night walkers” as for arrests.  Deciding what
140 One reader worried about the effect of my restriction of warrants to the home,
using the following hypothetical.  An accountant walks down the street, carrying a
briefcase, and police seize the briefcase based on probable cause to think that it con-
tains documents incriminating someone else.  Let us assume that the police believe
the accountant is innocent of any wrongdoing and thus do not have probable cause to
arrest her.  But when the police search her briefcase, they also find her cocaine.  My
Fourth Amendment would permit the cocaine to be introduced against the account-
ant because no warrant is required to search outside the home.
In Chadwick v. United States, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), federal agents seized a footlocker
and took it to the federal building.  The Court held that the agents should have ob-
tained a warrant to search the footlocker that was already safely in their possession.
Id. at 15.  Whether the agents could have searched the footlocker at the scene is
unclear from the opinion.  On the facts of Chadwick, where the police decided to seize
the object and take it back to a secure location, to require a warrant seems unexcep-
tional.  But to require the police to seize the accountant’s briefcase and hold it while
applying for a warrant is less obviously the right answer.  Cases of that description are
pretty rare because usually the probable cause that the person has evidence of a crime
on her person would justify her arrest and a search incident to arrest.  I prefer the
“bright line” of restricting warrants to the home rather than trying to develop a princi-
ple that would require police sometimes, but not always, to seize an object and get a
warrant before searching.
141 See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
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constitutes a “seizure of the person” is not, of course, easy, but the
Court’s definition in Terry v. Ohio 142 makes good sense: “[W]henever
a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has ‘seized’ the person.”143
Clause [8] is based on the Court’s reading of history.144  History
is less than clear that warrants were required for arrests in the
home,145 but the Court’s doctrine makes good sense even if history is
a bit opaque.  Clause [9] embraces the search incident to arrest doc-
trine, despite a lack of solid historical evidence.  History aside, the
policy considerations are so strong here—especially protecting the ar-
resting officer—that any limitation on searches simply must include
this exception.
From here, my plan is to show how my reconstructed Fourth
Amendment compares with what the Court has done.
V. ARGUMENTS FOR A RECONSTRUCTED FOURTH AMENDMENT
I shall proceed in a different order than the clauses are listed in
my reconstructed Fourth Amendment.  It makes sense to dispose of
the three clauses that do not involve complicated issues before pro-
ceeding to the ones that are both complicated and contentious.
A. Clause [6]: Property May Be Seized Only When Discovered During a
Lawful Search and When Police Have Probable Cause to Believe that It Is
Evidence of a Crime
History is indirectly helpful here.  When the First Congress in-
tended to authorize seizures, it required cause for the seizure.  The
1789 and 1790 Collection Acts are again illuminating.  Customs offi-
cials were authorized to seize goods when they had “reason to suspect”
that the goods were “subject to duty.”146  Upon reflection, any other
regime is unthinkable.  To enter and inspect is one kind of regime,
and customs agents could do those acts without individualized suspi-
cion when ships docked in our harbors, but the Framers would recoil
at the idea that a customs official could seize property without sus-
pecting that it was subject to the customs laws.  The standard for
142 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
143 Id. at 16.
144 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
145 In a rare serious treatment of history by the Court, the Payton majority and
dissent engage each other in a thoughtful and well-researched discussion of this
point.
146 Collection Act of 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (repealed by Act of Aug. 4,
1790, ch. 35, § 74, 1 Stat. 145, 178).
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seizure was “reason to suspect” that the goods are “subject to duty.”147
The Court’s modern doctrine parallels the history,148 probably be-
cause any other rule would make nonsense of a right against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.
Save seizures based on consent, which I will consider later, no
other mechanism for seizure is mentioned in the treatises, colonial
law, or early federal statutes.  The law required “reason to suspect”
that the item was subject to seizure.  As Justice Holmes once remarked
in another context, “[i]t is a short point.”149
B. Clause [4]: Warrants Are Required for Searches of a Structure, Except
as Permitted in [9], or of the Inside of the Human Body, but Are Not
Required for Any Other Searches
Colonial search warrants were sometimes broader than a search
of a structure,150 yet it is difficult to imagine what would be searched
other than a structure, a ship or other vehicle, an open space, or a
person.  Whatever the common law, the language of the Amendment
(“persons, houses, papers, and effects”) excludes open spaces and
ships.  One could, of course, consider a ship an “effect,” but that
seems unlikely.  Davies concludes that ships, governed by admiralty
law, were sui generis and not included in the language of the Fourth
Amendment.151  I see no reason to disagree.
That leaves structures, other vehicles, and persons.  Unlike ships,
other vehicles would be considered an “effect,” but clause [4] makes
clear that no warrant is required, thus adopting the doctrine the
Court finally developed after some fits and starts.  The search of per-
sons incident to arrest is covered by clause [9].  All other searches of
persons are covered by clause [3], which requires probable cause but
no warrant.  As to the nature of structures, I intend to cover all struc-
tures—barns, outbuildings, and commercial premises as well as
houses.  Davies concludes that the Framers would have envisioned
much less protection for commercial premises than for homes.152
That may be right, though the first customs law required warrants to
search for concealment in a “dwelling-house, store, building, or other
147 Id.
148 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
149 United States v. Adams, 281 U.S. 202, 204 (1930).  Holmes’s “short point” was
to reject the government’s argument that two false entries in bank books, relating to
the same deposit and credit, were two offenses of fraud against the bank.
150 See supra text accompanying note 100. R
151 Davies, supra note 28, at 604–08. R
152 Id. at 608.
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place.”153  That seems sufficient historical evidence to use the word
“structure” in place of “home” in clause [4].  Additional evidence that
warrants were required for searches of structures can be found in the
actions of the Continental Congress.  At the height of the Revolution-
ary War, the Continental Congress recommended to the various states
that they make it a crime to harbor deserters.  Part of the recom-
mended law was to fine “any commissioned officer, constable, or
other person” who “shall break open any dwelling House, or outhouse
under pretense to search for deserters, without warrant from a Justice
of the peace . . . if no deserter shall be found therein.”154  To be sure,
this is a weak form of a warrant requirement as no sanction applies
unless the searcher was mistaken about the presence of deserters, but
it nonetheless shows that warrants were important when officers
sought to justify entry into homes or even outbuildings.
The search warrant requirement I propose is a robust version of
the Court’s current warrant requirement.  The Court held in 1914
that a search warrant was required to search a home155 and it has re-
peated that statement of the core Fourth Amendment protection in
many cases.156  My formulation is a robust version of the Court’s rule
because clause [4] permits no exceptions.  All searches of structures
must be by warrant.  No exception exists for exigent circumstances
because, I will argue later, any exigency can be thoroughly mitigated
through the exigent exception for warrantless arrests in the home.
More controversially, there is no exception for consent.  Consent
is offered to justify searches of homes and of persons and vehicles.157
My reconstructed Fourth Amendment rejects consent as a justification
for any kind of search.  Because consent comes up much more fre-
quently as a justification to search persons or vehicles than homes, I
defer defending its elimination until I discuss the clause [3] require-
ment of probable cause.158  The same justifications that undergird the
argument in the clause [3] context apply to the warrant requirement
here.
153 Collection Act of 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (repealed by Act of August 4,
1790, ch. 35, § 74, 1 Stat. 145, 178).
154 7 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 95, at 117. R
155 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
156 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 445 (1971); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
157 See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (using apparent consent to
justify the search of an apartment); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
(using consent to justify the search of a car).
158 See infra notes 285–314 and accompanying text. R
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C. Clause [5]: Searches of Structures and Arrests Inside a Structure Shall
Occur in the Daytime and Pursuant to Notice to Occupants, Unless to Give
Notice Would Expose the Officer to Grave Danger
The daytime requirement appears in the first federal customs law
and makes good sense.  If an emergency justifies entry into a home in
the nighttime, clause [8] permits an entry to make an arrest, assuming
the probable cause requirement in [7] is met.  If the suspect is ar-
rested, clause [9] permits police to search the area of the arrestee’s
immediate control.  Police can thus take actions to protect themselves
from danger arising from the exigency that justified the entry in the
first place; nothing in my reconstructed Amendment would forbid
this.  Moreover, nothing in my Fourth Amendment would forbid se-
curing the premises so that no one can leave or enter until the next
day when a warrant can justify a thorough search.159  Thus, no reason
suggests permitting entry into a home at night merely to make a
search that could be made during the day.
The notice requirement is solidly embedded in the common law.
It appears in a 1603 case that considered it already part of the com-
mon law when codified in 1275!160  In Wilson v. Arkansas, the Court
cited several Framing-era sources,161 which shows that it was still fol-
lowed in the eighteenth century.  William Hawkins, one of the most
influential commentators in the years leading up to the Bill of Rights,
stated the rule clearly and noted no exceptions, although, to be sure,
his rule was limited to making arrests inside a structure.162  But the
1603 case that traced the rule back to 1275 stated the rule to include
“other execution of the K[ing]’s process.”163  And it makes no sense to
require notice for an arrest inside a structure and not require notice
for a thorough search of the premises, so we should read Hawkins to
include the execution of search warrants.  Here is his formulation of
the principle:
And now I am to consider in what Cases it is lawful to break open
Doors to apprehend Offenders; and to this Purpose I shall premise,
159 See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (plurality opinion).  The
Court has held that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to search after the
exigency has ceased. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
160 Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 932 n.2 (1995) (citing Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng.
Rep. 194, 196 (K.B. 1603), which concludes that the 1275 statute was “but an affirm-
ance of the common law” (referring to 3 Edw., ch. 17 (Eng.), in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE
6 (Owen Ruffhead ed., London, M. Basket 1769))).
161 Id. at 932–34.
162 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 14, § 1, at 136
(John Curwood ed., 8th ed., London, C. Roworth 1824) (1721).
163 Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603).
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That the Law doth never allow of such Extremities but in Cases of
Necessity; and therefore, That no one can justify the Breaking open
another’s Doors to make an Arrest, unless he first signify to those in
the House the cause of his Coming and request them to give him
Admittance.164
As Davies has noted, none of the Framing-era sources admit of
exceptions, though the Court, in this instance ignoring history, has
conveniently read the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” require-
ment in the first clause “not . . . to mandate a rigid rule of announce-
ment that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests.”165  The
Court is right that strong policy grounds favor an exception when giv-
ing notice would expose the officers to danger.  Indeed, Hawkins’s
statement of the rule speaks of “Necessity.”  Whether or not the com-
mon law recognized grave danger to the officer as a “Necessity” that
would obviate the need to give notice, we should today.  I think it is a
much harder question whether destruction of evidence is a sufficient
“Necessity” to justify not giving notice.  Given the Framers’ feelings
about law officers invading the security of the home,166 the Framers
might have rejected out of hand an exception for destruction of evi-
dence.  Since the policy reasons are weaker for that one, I decided to
include an exception only for the times when giving notice would ex-
pose the officer to grave danger.  If notice permits a suspect to destroy
evidence, so be it.
The other issue posed by this clause is how long the officer must
wait for an answer to the notice before he can force entry.  Tracey
Maclin has demonstrated that the Framing-era sources state or imply
that an officer must be refused entry before he can force entry.167
Cuddihy notes: “The statutes or legal manuals of at least seven states
limited forcible entry [at least in some categories of cases] to cases of
resistance.”168  As in the creation of exceptions to the knock and an-
nounce rule, the Court conveniently ignores this aspect of search and
seizure history.169  Again, policy reasons are on the Court’s side.  To
164 2 HAWKINS, supra note 162, ch. 14, § 1, at 136. R
165 Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934–35.  Davies concludes that this exception was “a depar-
ture from historical doctrine.”  Davies, supra note 28, at 742 n.561.  The cases that the R
Court cites fail to establish any general rule of reasonableness from the common law.
166 See supra text accompanying notes 122 and 123. R
167 Maclin, supra note 42, at 903–17, 904 n.37 (citing 1 HALE, supra note 36, at R
*582; 3 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 1512–13).  Hawkins states the resistance principle R
explicitly. See 2 HAWKINS, supra note 162, ch. 14, § 1, at 136. R
168 3 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 1344. R
169 See Maclin, supra note 42, at 904–05 (noting that “[a]t key places in his opinion R
[for the Court], Justice Thomas omits” this part of the common law rule).
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require the officer to wait until an answer is given is plainly unwork-
able.  Suspects could remain holed up in their homes for days or
weeks.  It is one kind of problem not to be able to arrest a smuggler or
counterfeiter in 1792 because he remained in his home for weeks, if
that was the colonial-era law.  It is a completely different kind of prob-
lem not to be able to arrest a murderer, robber, or terrorist because
he refuses to say “no” when the officer demands entry.  At some point,
saying nothing should be construed as saying “no.”  The Court held
that a fifteen-to-twenty-second wait can satisfy the Fourth Amendment
on this point.170  I suspect the best answer is somewhere between the
apparent Framing-era rule of “forever” and the Court’s fifteen
seconds.  That level of detail, however, is beyond the scope of my cur-
rent project.
D. Clause [9]: All Arrests Permit the Arresting Officer to Search the
Arrestee and the Area of His Immediate Control
Despite the Court’s oft-repeated assurance that this mode of
search has been “always recognized under English and American
law,”171 support for that proposition is surprisingly hard to find.  Da-
vies cites a single colonial-era source, an essay by a former High Con-
stable of Middlesex, England, reprinted in a manual for justices of the
peace.  It advised constables that “ ‘a thorough search of the [ar-
rested] felon is of the utmost consequence to your own safety, and . . .
by this means he will be deprived of instruments of mischief, and evi-
dence may probably be found on him sufficient to convict him.’”172
Davies then observed that “the doctrine of search incident to arrest is
not uniformly accorded importance in the Framing-era materials,”
noting that there is no mention of the doctrine in a Virginia justice of
the peace manual published around the time of the Framing.173
We have already seen Cuddihy’s conclusion that colonial-era ar-
restees could “expect that not only his surface clothing but his body,
luggage, and saddlebags would be searched and, perhaps, his shoes,
socks, and mouth as well.”174  He cites no American, and only three
English,175 cases.  He does refer to many letters, memoranda, deposi-
170 United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003).
171 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
172 Davies, supra note 28, at 627 n.213 (quoting An Essay on the Office of Consta- R
ble, Saunders Welch, reprinted in CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 109, 117 (James Parker ed.,
New York, John Patterson 1788)).
173 Id. (referring to WILLIAM WALLER HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE (Richmond,
Aug. Davis 1799)).
174 2 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 847–48. R
175 2 id. at 847.
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tions, and newspaper accounts.  He also refers to “numerous legal
manuals” recognizing the principle that authorities can search some-
one who has been arrested after an officer has forced entry.176  But as
Cuddihy himself seems to recognize at a later point in his dissertation,
most of these manuals stand only for the proposition that “officials
could force open doors to serve arrest warrants, not [that] they could
search after achieving entrance or how far [they could search].”177
Whatever the best reading of history, the policy reasons support-
ing this type of search are overwhelming.  To expect an officer to
place an arrestee in the back of his patrol car without checking to see
if he is armed is to expect more than humans can deliver.  And if the
police are permitted to search for weapons, they will often come upon
evidence of a crime, and it would be bizarre to say that they must
pretend they did not see it.  Moreover, permitting a search incident to
arrest does not ignore probable cause.  There must be probable cause
to make the arrest, after all.  Rare will be the arrest based on probable
cause that does not automatically give rise to probable cause to search
the person and his area of control, as Justice Scalia implied in a recent
concurring opinion.178  The arrest of those suspected of robbery, bur-
glary, and all crimes of violence would likely give rise to probable
cause to search for weapons.  Arrest for any drug offense would surely
create probable cause to search for drugs.  Rather than litigate this
issue in every case, why not have a bright-line rule permitting what
sound policy suggests?179  The history is certainly not contrary to this
rule.
176 3 id. at 1352 (citing seven legal manuals in note 240).
177 3 id. at 1552.
178 See Thornton v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 2135–36 (2004) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment).  That rare case does indeed exist, however.  It is the case
where the Court made clear the automatic nature of the right to search incident to
arrest.  In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), the defendant was arrested
for operating a motor vehicle after revocation of his operator’s permit.  The Court
permitted a search of his person incident to that arrest.
179 Justice Marshall has argued, in dissent, that the question of whether the officer
could search an arrestee for weapons or evidence should be litigated in every case.
See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 248–59 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas and Bren-
nan, JJ.).  Thomas Clancy has suggested that perhaps only certain categories of of-
fenses should give rise to a bright-line rule permitting a full search of the arrestee.
Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes an “Arrest” Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 129, 178–79 (2003).
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E. The Right . . . Shall Not Be Violated by [2] Warrants Issuing Without
Probable Cause, Supported By Oath or Affirmation from a Named Person,
and Particularly Describing the Place to Be Searched, and the Persons or
Things to Be Seized
The problems the Framers sought to remedy were the writs of
assistance and general warrants.  Writs of assistance permitted British
customs officials to enter and inspect any house.180  Examples of gen-
eral warrants that we saw earlier included a warrant “to suppress coun-
terfeiting, arson, and insurrection” and a warrant to search “‘in all
places’ where the informant and the . . . sheriff suspected that coun-
terfeit coins or the machinery for manufacturing them might be
found.”181  Compared to the writs of assistance or general warrants,
the Warrant Clause problems the Court has had to police are of a
smaller scale.
Few cases manifest a failure of the formal requirements of the
Warrant Clause.  One is Coolidge v. New Hampshire,182 where a peculiar
New Hampshire statute permitted prosecutors and police to be jus-
tices of the peace and thus authorized them to issue warrants.183  The
police testified at Coolidge’s trial that the police never went outside
the police department or the prosecutor’s office to get warrants is-
sued.184  The crime being investigated was a horrific one, the brutal
murder of a child, in a state that is relatively crime free (New Hamp-
shire).  While one would think the State Attorney General would be
extra cautious in a case like this, he nonetheless issued the warrant to
search Coolidge’s home and car.185  Nothing in the Fourth Amend-
ment says explicitly that warrants have to be issued by a neutral and
detached magistrate, but one does not have to strain too hard to see
that requirement as implicit.  As the Court put it, “it is too plain for
extensive discussion that this now abandoned New Hampshire
method of issuing ‘search warrants’ violated a fundamental premise of
180 Once authorized by the English monarch, the authority did not lapse during
the life of the monarch.  They could be issued by various officials during the mon-
arch’s reign without any further authorization.  Prior to the Revolution, writs of assis-
tance had been understood to authorize British customs officers “to enter and inspect
all houses without any warrant.”  2 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 759.  Cuddihy concludes R
that this understanding violated both local law and British law.  2 id.
181 2 id. at 1144–45.
182 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
183 Id. at 447.
184 Id. at 452.
185 Id. at 447.
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both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments”—that the magistrate
who issues the warrant must be “neutral and detached.”186
Another failure involved the odd case of Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New
York.187  The Town Justice viewed two films that an investigator had
purchased from the local “adult” bookstore and determined them to
be obscene.  The Town Justice issued a warrant “authorizing the
search” of defendant’s store “and the seizure of other copies of the
two files exhibited to the Town Justice.”188  So far, so good.  But the
affidavit also asserted that “similar” items could be found in the adult
book store, items that affiant believed “were possessed in violation of
the obscenity laws,”189  and the warrant application asked the Justice
to accompany the investigator to the store when the warrant was exe-
cuted.  The warrant authorized the seizure of “ ‘[t]he following items
that the Court independently [on examination] has determined to be
possessed in violation of ’” state law, with no items listed at the time
the Justice signed the warrant.190  What the Court called a “search
party” of eleven investigators, including the Justice and three mem-
bers of the local prosecutor’s office, then “converged on the
bookstore.”191
After the Justice’s inspection of the various items for sale, the
state police seized twenty-three films, four coin-operated projectors,
397 magazines, and 431 reels of film.192  These items were later added
to the warrant, expanding it to sixteen pages.193  In a unanimous, and
not very illuminating, opinion, the Court held the warrant unconstitu-
tional.  Sniffing that it was “reminiscent of the general warrant or writ
of assistance,”194 the Court found a failure of the particularity require-
ment.  But except for the involvement of the Town Justice at the scene
of the search, it is not clear what was wrong with the procedure.  Imag-
ine that the investigator purchased one each of the items seized and
took each to the Town Justice, who added the names of the films and
magazines to the warrant that permitted a search for more of the
items listed.  There is no particularity problem here.  Perhaps the
problem is that the search party did not pay for the items, and so they
were seized when they were viewed or had the plastic wrappers pulled
186 Id. at 453.
187 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
188 Id. at 321.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 321–22.
191 Id. at 322.
192 Id. at 322–23.
193 Id. at 324.
194 Id. at 325.
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off for inspection.  But if this is the Fourth Amendment violation, it is
based on the failure to have a warrant at the moment of seizure and
not, as the Court maintains, the failure of the warrant particularly to
describe.  It seems that the real flaw is that the search was “reminis-
cent” of the general warrant.
Moving beyond form, the Warrant Clause has caused the Court at
least one problem with substance: how to define “probable cause” so
that the Magistrate’s issuance of the warrant can be reviewed by other
courts.  The probable cause issue has been difficult for the Court.
The Warren Court developed an “Aguilar-Spinelli 195 two-pronged” test
that led to a conceptual and somewhat finely-spun doctrine of proba-
ble cause.  Whether the Supreme Court was right in Illinois v. Gates196
to reject the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test, the fine distinctions
would likely have struck the Framers as much ado about nothing (in-
deed, it might strike modern readers that way too!).197
Blackstone stated that a justice of the peace could issue an arrest
warrant based on the sworn testimony of the party praying for the
warrant because the justice “is a competent judge of the probability
offered to him of such suspicion.”198  He continued:
[I]t is fitting to examine upon oath the party requiring a warrant, as
well to ascertain that there is a felony or other crime actually com-
mitted, without which no warrant should be granted; as also to prove
the cause and probability of suspecting the party, against whom the
warrant is prayed.199
What counted for Blackstone and for the Framers was that a jus-
tice of the peace inquire into the sworn testimony of the complainant
and issue or not issue the warrant.  The precise nature of the
“probability of suspecting the party”200 could be safely left to justices
of the peace.  The Fourth Amendment, of course, requires probable
cause and explicitly gives magistrates the power to refuse to issue war-
rants.  It would please the Framers that magistrates today examine the
warrant application and the affiant and require a showing of probable
cause by whatever quantum of evidence.
195 The name derives from two Warren Court cases that sought to provide gui-
dance to lower courts in search warrant cases, Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
196 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
197 For a detailed exegesis of this issue, I recommend Yale Kamisar, Gates, “Proba-
ble Cause,” “Good Faith,” and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV. 551 (1984).
198 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at *287. R
199 4 id.
200 See 4 id. at *287.
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I doubt that it would please the Framers that warrants can issue
solely on the basis of “a confidential, reliable” informant, as the Su-
preme Court permitted in McCray v. Illinois.201  Not only is an un-
named source sufficient to demonstrate probable cause, in the
Court’s view, but also the government never need divulge the identity
of the informant.  The Court did all of this without even a nod at the
common law history that required, before an arrest warrant could is-
sue on suspicion of felony, a complaining party to make an accusation
to the Magistrate that a felony had occurred; the common law also
required the Magistrate to “examine upon oath” the one making the
accusation so that the Magistrate can be a “competent judge of those
circumstances, that may induce the granting of a warrant to arrest.”202
To be sure, Madison lessened the common law requirements for
search and arrest warrants by substituting “probable cause” for the
more rigid accusatorial requirement that a complainant swear that a
crime had occurred and that he “possessed probable cause of suspi-
cion regarding the perpetrator’s identity.”203  But to eliminate the al-
legation that a crime in fact had occurred says nothing about whether
Madison intended to eliminate the requirement that the “Oath or af-
firmation” be made by a known complainant.  The common law went
so far as to consider the complainant a trespasser if the property
turned out not to be where the complainant swore.  As Lord Hale put
it, the “party that made the suggestion [in the accusation] is punisha-
ble in such a case” because the breaking of the door to execute the
warrant was unlawful if the goods are not there.204  It would be diffi-
cult indeed to punish a “confidential, reliable informant” whose iden-
tity is never divulged.
Given the common law position on the role and accountability of
the complaining party who offers justification for issuing the warrant,
I believe that when Madison wrote the words “supported by Oath or
affirmation,” he had in his mind the words “by a named person.”  Any
other reading is too severe a departure from the common law.  I thus
added those words in my reformulated Fourth Amendment, rectifying
what I believe was Madison’s failure to make his meaning explicit.  In
my world, McCray no longer lives.
201 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
202 2 HALE, supra note 36, at *110. McCray involved a warrantless arrest, but its R
probable cause principle is not limited to the warrantless context.  Thus, police can
now make up an informer, “Old Reliable,” and use him to support probable cause for
a search or arrest warrant. See Craig M. Bradley, Murray v. United States: The Bell Tolls
for the Search Warrant Requirement, 64 IND. L.J. 907, 915–18 (1989).
203 Davies, supra note 28, at 651–52. R
204 2 HALE, supra note 36, at *151. R
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F. Clause [8]: Warrants Are Required for All Arrests in the Home Unless
the Arrest Is Made in Hot Pursuit or to Protect Life or Property
Here I follow the Court’s doctrine in Payton v. New York.205  As
Payton concedes, the common law is less than clear that warrants were
required for arrests in the home.  The most famous rule from the En-
glish cases is actually dictum and is far from clear.206  Blackstone de-
clared that the law permitted a warrantless arrest in the home upon
hot pursuit207 and in the “prosecution” of a hue and cry.208  Hawkins
devoted an entire chapter to arrest in the home, and the best reading
of Hawkins is that only three exceptions existed to the requirement
that a warrant, a capias, or some other kind of process was required to
force entry into a structure and make an arrest.209  Other than hot
pursuit, Hawkins stated exceptions for when a lawfully arrested person
escapes and retreats to a house and when an “affray” occurs in a house
in the view or hearing of a constable.210
Thus, it seems to me that the majority in Payton is right to read
the common law as requiring a warrant except for hot pursuit and
other exigencies.  Because the Court requires a search warrant to
search a home, and because an arrest is at least as great an invasion of
one’s liberties as a search, symmetry suggests requiring a warrant for
an arrest in the home.  The Court said that to do otherwise would be
to “disregard the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that
has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Repub-
lic.”211  I see no reason to disagree with the policy implicit in the
Court’s rhetoric.
G. Clause [9]: No Arrests or Other Seizure of a Person Shall Be Made on
Less than Probable Cause
The common law was clear that individualized cause was needed
to make an arrest.212  As early as the thirteenth century, the common
law required some level of cause to force a defendant to prove his
205 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
206 The King’s Bench in Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195–96 (K.B. 1603),
said: “In all cases when the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may
break the party’s house, either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K.’s
process, if otherwise he cannot enter.”  The majority thought that “other execution of
the King’s process” implied that the Sheriff was there pursuant to a warrant.
207 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at *290. R
208 4 id. at *291.
209 2 HAWKINS, supra note 162, ch. 14,  §§ 1–4, 10. R
210 See 2 id. ch. 14,  §§ 7–9, at 136–37.
211 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980).
212 Clancy agrees. See Clancy, supra note 37, at 493. R
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innocence.  Bracton reported that a belief of guilt held by “worthy
and trustworthy persons” was sufficient to justify an indictment but
“the idle talk of the people is not to be heeded.”213  At least by 1611,
the common law required “good cause” to make an arrest for a felony,
though this could be satisfied by “the common fame and voice.”214
Michael Dalton’s 1622 handbook for justices of the peace noted that
every man may arrest another whom he knows to have committed a
felony.215  Moreover, every man “may arrest suspicious persons that be
of ill fame” as long as there was “some felony committed in deed.”216
Dalton also states a requirement that the one making the arrest per-
sonally knows of the suspicion and that the suspicion be for a particu-
lar felony.217
By Blackstone’s day, the notion of “ill fame” as a basis for suspi-
cion had disappeared.  Blackstone used the term “probable suspicion”
at one point to describe the cause that the arresting party must
have.218  The common law might not have vested much significance in
the quantum or quality of the suspicion because the arrested individ-
ual would be brought before a justice of the peace, who was “bound
immediately to examine the circumstances of the crime alleged.”219
“If upon this enquiry it manifestly appears, either that no such crime
was committed, or that the suspicion entertained of the prisoner was
wholly groundless, in such cases only it is lawful totally to discharge
him.”220  Thus, mistakes made at the arrest stage could be quickly
corrected.
The Continental Congress in 1774 condemned customs searches
without warrants based on “legal information.”221  The Framers, of
course, used probable cause in the Warrant Clause, and the Court’s
assumption that the same standard should govern arrests is a sound
one.  Thus, I include the principle of no arrests without probable
cause.
213 2 HENRICI DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 404 (Samuel
E. Thorne trans., 1977) (1569).
214 Sir Anthony Ashley’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1366, 1368 (K.B. 1611); see also 2
HALE, supra note 36, at *81 (giving “common fame” as a basis for “probable cause” to R
arrest).




218 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at *290. R
219 4 id. at *293.
220 4 id.
221 Davies, supra note 28, at 604. R
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But my clause is concerned with more than just arrests because it
says “no arrests or other seizure of the person shall be made on less
than probable cause.”  This is a direct attack on Terry v. Ohio,222 where
the Court held that a seizure and limited search could be made on
less than probable cause.  It should not be surprising that my reconsti-
tuted Fourth Amendment has no room for Terry. Terry, after all,
cleanly severs the Reasonableness Clause from the Warrant Clause
and seeks to find doctrinal implications in the Reasonableness Clause.
The Court conceded: “If this case involved police conduct subject to
the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, we would have to as-
certain whether ‘probable cause’ existed to justify the search and
seizure which took place.”223  But, the Court hastened to add, “that is
not the case” when an officer makes a temporary “stop” rather than an
arrest.  With the Warrant Clause rendered inoperative, the Court was
free to wander about the Reasonableness Clause: “[T]he conduct in-
volved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment’s general
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.”224
Terry seemed a narrow exception to probable cause, limited to
cases where a police officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that a
violent crime is about to occur.  In that situation, who (except for Jus-
tice Douglas) would not want the officer to intervene?  Moreover,
Chief Justice Warren sought to hedge the Terry rule with a set of re-
quirements, all of which were essential to the holding.  Here is the
Court’s statement of its holding:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his ex-
perience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies him-
self as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and  others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.225
That holding seems inoffensive enough.  But the Court has discarded
one after another of the limitations, almost always without even ac-
knowledging that it was expanding Terry.  Today, Terry has fundamen-
tally changed the Fourth Amendment map.  As Scott Sundby put it:
222 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
223 Id. at 20.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 30.
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Instead of carving out a narrow exception to probable cause, rea-
sonable suspicion became a valid compromise standard that com-
ports with the fourth amendment if the Court decides that, after
balancing the interests, it is reasonable. The government no longer
argues against a presumed starting point of probable cause but
rather argues for reasonable suspicion as a reasonable accommoda-
tion of competing interests.  Probable cause becomes merely one
point on a continuum of reasonableness.226
The reader will not be surprised by this point that I level two criti-
cisms at Terry.  First, “unreasonable” is just too amorphous to provide
a workable standard.  Whatever it might have meant to the Framers,
today it means what five members of the Court agree that it means.  It
means, for example, that an anonymous tip only vaguely verified, and
that turned out to be incorrect, can justify a stop of a vehicle.227  It means
that a tip offered by someone whose only other tip had proven to be
wrong can justify ordering a driver out of his car.228  It means that
“unprovoked flight” after the appearance of a police caravan in a
high-crime neighborhood can justify forcibly stopping an individ-
ual.229 Terry, in short, is “one immense Rorschach blot.”230
My most fundamental criticism, though, is that the Framers
would not have understood this amphibian event—a seizure that is, by
the Court’s own admission, not an arrest; a search that is admittedly
not the kind of search that a warrant can authorize.  In 1622, The
Countrey Justice stated that an arrest is the “first restraining of a mans
person, depriving it of his own will and liberty; and may be called the
beginning of imprisonment.”231  To Blackstone, it was clear that “no
man is to be arrested, unless charged with such a crime, as will at least
226 Scott Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of
Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 402 (1988).
227 In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), the anonymous tip was that Vanessa
White, possessing an ounce of cocaine, would leave a certain apartment building in a
particular vehicle and go to Dobey’s Motel. Id. at 327.  The officers verified that the
vehicle was in front of the apartment building.  They saw a woman leave the building,
get in the vehicle, and start driving toward Dobey’s Motel. Id.  Before the driver gave
any direct indication that Dobey’s Motel was her destination, however, the officer
pulled her over, obtained consent to search, and found marijuana in her attache case.
Only three milligrams of cocaine were found. Id.
228 Adams v. Williams, 40 U.S. 143 (1972).
229 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
230 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 393 (1974).  For a brave, but to me ultimately unpersuasive, effort to unravel the
Rorschach blot by creating “tiers of proportionality,” see Christopher Slobogin, Let’s
Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 1053, 1093–95 (1998).
231 DALTON, supra note 215, at 306. R
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justify holding him to bail, when taken.”232  Moreover, once arrested,
he was a prisoner and the Justice of the Peace must either release him
as wrongly arrested, give him bail, or commit him to prison.233  Even
“night walkers” whose offense seems to have been to “sleep in the day
time and go abroad in the nights”234 were to be arrested and held in
custody until morning235 when they, presumably, would face an exam-
ination by the Justice of the Peace like any other arrested person.236
In sum, the common law authorized an “all or nothing” interfer-
ence with the liberty of those suspected of felony when a felony had
occurred.  The Constable, or a private citizen, could arrest someone
on probable suspicion that he had committed the felony.  This event
began the process of imprisonment, though the Justice of the Peace
could discharge the arrestee if he found the charge to be “wholly
groundless.”237  As Justice Douglas pointed out in his Terry dissent, the
effect of the “stop and frisk” regime is to permit police to seize and
search in situations when magistrates would be forbidden to authorize
an interference with liberty: “Had a warrant been sought, a magistrate
would . . . have been unauthorized to issue one, for he can act only if
there is a showing of ‘probable cause.’”238  Isn’t that an odd way to
read the Fourth Amendment?  Well, it is if one seeks an authentic
Fourth Amendment with its abhorrence of general warrants based on
loose suspicion.  In Justice Douglas’s somewhat purplish prose:
To give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a
long step down the totalitarian path.  Perhaps such a step is desira-
ble to cope with modern forms of lawlessness.  But if it is taken, it
should be the deliberate choice of the people through a constitu-
tional amendment.239
232 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at *286. R
233 4 id. at *293.
234 DALTON, supra note 215, at 76. R
235 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at *289. R
236 This is the implication from DALTON, supra note 215, at 77–78.  Dalton did not R
distinguish these arrests from any other kind of arrest. Though Dalton refers to ar-
rests of night walkers by order of a justice of the peace, Blackstone is clear that these
arrests could occur without a warrant.  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at *289. R
237 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at *293. R
238 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 36 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
239 Id. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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H. Clause [1]: The Right of the People to Be Secure in their Persons,
Houses, Papers, Written Communications, and Personal Property, Against
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, Shall Not Be Violated
Whether or not the Framers intended the first clause of the
Fourth Amendment to have any substantive content,240 it functions to
define the scope of the Amendment.  I added “written communica-
tions” on the ground that we do a lot of writing today without the use
of paper.  In the Framing era, indeed until very recently, all written
communication had to be made on paper and thus would qualify as
an “effect” in the Framers’ Fourth Amendment or as “personal prop-
erty” in my revised Fourth Amendment.  I wanted to be clear that e-
mail should not be unprotected simply because it is not on paper.
That an item is included in the list of protected items does not
mean that a particular use of that item will be protected.  My e-mail to
the dean should be protected from the prying eyes of the police un-
less they have probable cause, but if I broadcast the e-mail to everyone
in the university, I have waived my Fourth Amendment protection.  I
will return to this point shortly.
First, the easy cases.  Personal property includes all personalty
that it is legal to possess.  This requirement is implicit in the notion of
a right “to be secure in their . . . personal property.”  If it is not legal to
own the property, then it is not “their” property.  This category thus
includes cars, luggage, containers, and computers but does not in-
clude contraband.
“Papers” overlaps to a large degree, but not entirely, with “written
communications.”  An e-mail is not a paper, and a diary is not a writ-
ten communication.  Personal property includes vehicles, of course,
so my Fourth Amendment, like the one the Framers wrote, has to deal
with car searches.  To be secure in our “persons” means our liberty
not to be restrained or have our persons searched unless the police
have complied with the relevant parts of my Fourth Amendment.
“Houses” is a clear enough concept, though the Court has not offered
much help in defining the curtilage that is protected along with our
houses.241  Whether barns are included as “houses” seems questiona-
240 For an exacting argument that the Framers intended only the Warrant Clause
to have substantive content, see Davies, supra note 28, at 619–724. R
241 Curtilage is an area adjacent to the house that is protected along with the
house. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).  A garage is, I suppose, an
easy example.  The Court assumed in its “fly-over” cases that a greenhouse and a back
yard protected by two tall fences were part of curtilage. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445 (1989) (assuming a greenhouse is a part of curtilage); California v. Ciraolo, 478
U.S. 207 (1986) (assuming a backyard is a part of curtilage).
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ble.  What is pellucidly clear, in my view, is that real property that is
not a home or near a home is not protected.
History agrees with the Court’s holding in Oliver v. United States 242
that the Fourth Amendment does not protect a marijuana field that
was several hundred yards from the road despite the existence of a
fence, a locked gate, and a “No Trespassing” sign.243  It probably
seems self-evident that a field several hundred yards from a house is
not a “house.”  If one needs more evidence, consider that Madison’s
original draft of the Fourth Amendment protected “their persons,
their houses, their papers, and their other property.”244  The locution
“other property” was changed to “effects.”  Though there is precious
little legislative history on point, “effects” is a smaller universe than
“other property.”  Indeed, the inference that “other property” would
include real property other than houses while “effects” referred to
personal property is irresistible.245  Thus, when the House Committee
reported out “effects” in place of “other property,”246 one must as-
sume that the Framers intended to exclude real property other than
houses.
Most contemporary cases in which the Court seeks to determine
the scope of the Fourth Amendment by finding its “edges” are not as
easy as Oliver.  The Court initially saw the question as whether the au-
thorities invaded one’s property interest in the item seized or the area
searched.  So if the authorities seized some papers from the defen-
dant’s office, he could claim Fourth Amendment protection both be-
cause the papers were his and because he had a property interest in
the office “space” as well.247
By making the Fourth Amendment depend on property interests,
the Court was almost surely replicating the Framers’ Fourth Amend-
ment.  It is difficult to imagine “persons, houses, papers, and effects”
in the minds of the Framers as anything but property concepts.  And
the Court continued to consider property interests as the “edges” of
the Fourth Amendment for many decades.  Thus, a listening device
attached to the wall of an adjoining room that did not belong to the
defendant was outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the Court
held in Goldman v. United States.248  A “spike mike” inserted into the
242 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
243 These are the facts of one of the two companion cases.  The facts of the other
case demonstrated less effort to keep the marijuana patch private.
244 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
245 Davies, supra note 28, at 708–09. R
246 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 64, at 223–24. R
247 See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
248 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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wall from an adjoining room was, however, within the scope of the
Fourth Amendment if it made physical contact with the defendant’s
premises.249  But this is a pretty thin distinction.  Justice Douglas, con-
curring, complained about the Court’s reliance on the “trivialities of
local law of trespass,” and argued that the
depth of the penetration of the electronic device—even the degree
of its remoteness from the inside of the house—is not the measure
of the injury.  There is in each such case a search that should be
made, if at all, only on a warrant issued by a magistrate.250
Justice Douglas’s legitimate concern with measuring the extent of
the injury led the Court to abandon a property-based perimeter of the
Fourth Amendment.  In Katz v. United States,251 the Court faced a case
that the parties thought represented an extension of the “spike mike”
case.  Federal agents put a “bug” on a public phone booth that Katz
was using to convey gambling information.252  Katz argued that a pub-
lic phone booth was a constitutionally protected space and urged the
Court to overrule Goldman’s holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit a listening device on the wall of an adjoining
room.253  The government agreed with that phrasing of the issue but,
of course, argued that Goldman was correctly decided.254
The Court threw both parties a curve, concluding that “constitu-
tionally protected space” and the degree of invasion of property inter-
ests were not the right metrics for finding the edges of the Fourth
Amendment.255  For the relatively clear, if sometimes unsatisfying,
property-based edge, the Court substituted the hopelessly vague no-
tion of privacy.  It held that one who has closed the door of the public
phone booth and paid for his call has not knowingly exposed to the
public the contents of the call.256  Justice Harlan, concurring, re-
phrased the majority’s analysis as whether Katz had an expectation of
privacy when he made the call and whether that expectation was a
reasonable one.257  Justice Harlan’s test became the one the Court
would use to police the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment.
While the result in Katz seems intuitively right, the Court’s vague
and elastic notion of “reasonable expectation of privacy” has permit-
249 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
250 Id. at 513 (Douglas, J., concurring).
251 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
252 Id. at 348.
253 See id. at 349–50.
254 See id. at 352–53.
255 Id. at 353.
256 See id. at 351–52.
257 Id. at 360.
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ted the Court to refuse Fourth Amendment protection to banking
records, garbage placed in an opaque plastic bag and left for collec-
tion on one’s property, telephone numbers dialed from inside one’s
home, and the inside of one’s home when viewed from a helicopter or
low-flying plane.  As Justice Scalia has remarked, the expectations of
privacy that pass the Katz test “bear an uncanny resemblance to those
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.”258  As
Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher have demonstrated,
the views of the Court on this issue do not bear a very close resem-
blance to the views of the American people.259
A lot of people have criticized Katz, but most, like Wayne LaFave,
blame the Court for a “parsimonious” application that has led to an
“unrealistically circumscribed” scope of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.260  Yale Kamisar concluded that the Court has taken a narrow,
stingy view of what amounts to a “search” or “seizure.”261  Melvin Gut-
terman concluded that the Court has “pervert[ed] the doctrinal basis
of Katz.”262  Stated differently, the Court’s application of the Katz test,
in his view, “totally ignores the teachings of Katz.”263
Like Susan Bandes, Raymond Ku, Scott Sundby, and others, I
think Katz, as the Court has come to understand it, has nothing to
teach us.264  The “expectation of privacy” notion is flawed to the core.
Bandes and Ku think that the Amendment protects against misuse of
258 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
259 See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993).
260 Wayne R. LaFave, Computers, Urinals, and the Fourth Amendment: Confessions of a
Patron Saint, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2553, 2558 (1996) (calling the application “unrealisti-
cally circumscribed”); Wayne R. LaFave, The Present and Future Fourth Amendment, 1995
U. ILL. L. REV. 111, 113 (calling the application “parsimonious”); see also Lewis R.
Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549,
563–75 (1990) (arguing that Court has not followed Katz’s intended meaning); John
B. Mitchell, What Went Wrong with the Warren Court’s Conception of the Fourth Amend-
ment?, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 35, 47–53 (1992) (arguing that the Court missed a chance
to connect the Katz test to broader societal values).
261 Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospec-
tive, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 35 (1995).
262 Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth
Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647,
715 (1988).
263 Id. at 730.
264 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Power, Privacy and Thermal Imaging, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1379 (2002); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and
the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325 (2002); Sundby, supra note
25. R
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government power.  Sundby argues that Fourth Amendment ques-
tions should be examined in a framework in which we test whether
the government action manifests the level of trust that citizens have a
right to expect.  Unlike these abstract propositions, a return to the
language of the Amendment and to Justice Stewart’s opinion for the
Court in Katz is, in my view, the best road to travel.
I think Justice Black had the right approach, if not the right re-
sult, in his Katz dissent.  He grumpily contended that the Court did
not need a magic formula for measuring the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.  He argued that the Court had what it needed in the
language of the Fourth Amendment protecting our “persons, houses,
papers, and effects.”  To substitute a “right to privacy” for the specific
words of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Black worried, would make
the Court “a continuously functioning constitutional convention.”265
Justice Scalia has essentially adopted Justice Black’s position.
Calling the Katz test “self-indulgent,” Justice Scalia concludes that the
Fourth Amendment “did not guarantee some generalized ‘right to
privacy’ and leave it to this Court to determine which particular mani-
festations of the value of privacy ‘society is prepared to regard as “rea-
sonable.”’”266  Instead, Justice Scalia, as Justice Black before him,
argues that the Amendment protects “persons, houses, papers, and
effects.”267
I think Justices Black and Scalia are right on this point, but I
think Katz should have won his case on the theory that he urged—that
the Court should hold that a phone booth is a constitutionally pro-
tected space.  We rent hotel rooms, and they are protected by the
Fourth Amendment.268  When we close the door to the phone booth
and put our dime (in the old days) into the machine, why not simply
say we are renting the phone booth?  A phone booth is not unlike a
hotel room with respect to the key question of the “uninvited ear.”269
One who picks up a telephone in a hotel room or in a pay phone
booth is renting the space around the phone.  The hotel occupant is
renting more space but why should that matter?  The hotel room is
more private, but the Fourth Amendment does not, on Justice Black’s
and Justice Scalia’s view, protect privacy.  In their view, and mine, a
privacy metric is meaningless.  The relevant comparison is whether
Katz treated the space around him as his, however temporarily.
265 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
266 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
267 Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., concurring).
268 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
269 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
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On this view, Katz should win his argument by claiming that the
phone booth was, in effect, momentarily his house.  To be sure, the
Court in Katz is correct that I can waive or forfeit my Fourth Amend-
ment right by knowingly exposing those activities to the public.  Rely-
ing on Justice Harlan’s expectation of privacy test, the Court has read
“knowingly expose” very broadly.  In Smith v. Maryland,270 the suspect,
by dialing a phone in his home, knowingly exposed the numbers he
dialed to the phone company and thus forfeited the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.  Because I believe the Framers intended a robust
protection of the home, I would read “knowingly exposes” narrowly.  I
would require that the activities be exposed to the public at large.
Thus, I would draw a distinction between “exposing” phone numbers
to the telephone company and putting my marijuana Christmas tree
in front of my picture window and opening the curtains.
The expectation of privacy test has led to some pretty odd results.
For example, the issue in Smith v. Maryland was whether the Fourth
Amendment protected the telephone numbers dialed on a phone in-
side a home.  The Court consulted the information pages of the tele-
phone book and its own knowledge about how the telephone business
works to conclude that Smith did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the numbers he dialed.271  I have no idea whether that is
the right application of the malleable Katz test, but I think it is the
wrong question.  The right question is whether Smith knowingly ex-
posed the phone numbers to the public.  And I think the answer is
that he did not.
My reading of “knowingly expose” explains Kyllo v. United
States 272 much more effectively than the Court’s tortured analysis.
The issue in Kyllo was whether the Fourth Amendment protected heat
waves leaving a home.  If telephone numbers that leave the home are
not protected by the Fourth Amendment, as Smith reads Katz, why
would heat waves be protected?  Indeed, between the two, it seems to
me that the Katz expectation of privacy test would be more likely to
protect phone numbers.  Until I read Smith, I did not know that the
phone company could record local calls; I assumed the company used
special equipment to record long-distance calls.  But I knew, because
snow melts on my roof, that heat waves emanate from my house.  The
Kyllo majority gives the holding of Smith when surveying the Katz
cases273 but makes no effort to distinguish it.
270 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
271 Id.  at 742–43.
272 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
273 Id. at 33.
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Commentators have suggested that the cases can be reconciled by
reference to the Court’s qualification of the Kyllo principle.  In defin-
ing what constitutes a search, the Court wrote: “We think that ob-
taining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ con-
stitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question
is not in general public use.”274  If one believes that the “general pub-
lic use” phrase constitutes a limiting principle, the Court has sent
lower courts into a bewildering thicket, as Christopher Slobogin has
ably demonstrated.275  A small telescope is likely technology that is in
“general public use,” but what about a sophisticated, expensive tele-
scope that can see a quarter at 100 yards?
But I do not think the “general public use” phrase is a meaning-
ful limitation.  It is simply there because courts are conservative by
nature and do not wish, generally, to go beyond the facts of the case
before them.  I agree with Slobogin: “To the extent [Kyllo] endorses
the general public use concept or the related idea that details view-
able by the naked eye without physical intrusion also may be viewed
with technology, the ruling in Kyllo is seriously flawed.”276
In my mind, Smith and Kyllo simply cannot coexist.  Of course,
given the malleability of the Katz test, a future Court could candidly
concede that Smith (or Kyllo) made the wrong judgment.  But how
much better to have a test that doesn’t depend on the makeup of the
Court for its application?  Did Kyllo knowingly expose to the public
the heat waves that emanate from his home?  To ask the question is, I
believe, to answer it.
Thus, I think the Court went astray in the fly-over cases (or hover-
craft cases, as I described them in my introduction).  Do we have a
reasonable expectation of privacy against being observed through
holes in our roof from a helicopter flying in permitted airspace?  I
have no idea.  The Court split 5-4 on that question, ruling that the
observation was not a Fourth Amendment search.277  If we ask
whether someone has knowingly exposed the interior of his house to
274 Id. at 34 (citations omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
512 (1961)).
275 Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing
Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393 (2002).
276 Id. at 1411.
277 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (involving a partially-covered greenhouse
that the Court assumed was protected by the Fourth Amendment).  Though there was
no majority opinion, Justice O’Connor’s opinion concurring in the judgment agreed
with Justice White’s opinion for four justices that the observation was not a search.
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the public by leaving holes in his roof, I think the answer both easier
and different from the Court’s.  If the risk of disclosure is trivial, I
don’t think anything is knowingly exposed.  I would distinguish hav-
ing a skylight in my bathroom from opening my curtains to display my
Christmas tree.  In the former case, the risk of being observed from a
helicopter is trivial.  In the latter case, presumably I want my beauti-
fully decorated Christmas tree to be seen by passersby.
To limit the “knowingly exposes” principle to cases where the risk
is nontrivial is consistent with the Framers’ intent to protect homes
from government inspection.  Virtually every surviving polemic
against unreasonable searches that the Framers uttered revealed a
deep-seated fear of government intrusion into our homes and govern-
ment meddling with our personal property inside the home.  Patrick
Henry said that federal agents “may, unless the general government
be restrained by a bill of rights, or some similar restriction, go into
your cellars and rooms, and search, ransack, and measure, every thing
you eat, drink, and wear.”278  If agents search or measure from outside
the house, and I have not knowingly exposed the interior, how is it
any different from agents being inside the house when they search
and measure?
The robust “knowingly exposes” principle solves at least some
cases outside the house.  Consider the garbage case, California v.
Greenwood.279  In applying its expectation of privacy test, the Greenwood
Court made much of the possibility that “plastic garbage bags left on
or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, chil-
dren, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”280  But is
this a trivial risk?  I believe the answer is yes.  If the risk were anything
more than trivial, if we fully expected sometimes to discover that our
trash was strewn all over the street, no one would put garbage in
plastic bags.
Scott Sundby concluded that the Court’s discussion of privacy in
trash was “surreal” because “a far more important principle was at
stake, but the Katz test as it was being used was unable to ferret it
out.”281  Sundby would analyze the garbage question by asking
“whether government agents going through trash cans looking for evi-
dence of wrongdoing is consistent with a constitutional system based
on government-citizen trust.”282  Though Sundby’s approach is a vast
278 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 122, at 448–49 (reporting Patrick Henry’s June R
16, 1788, remarks at the Virginia ratification convention).
279 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
280 Id. at 40–41.
281 Sundby, supra note 25, at 1792. R
282 Id.
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improvement over Katz, it still seems too fuzzy to me.  I think we get a
clearer answer if we ask whether those who put trash in opaque plastic
bags have created a nontrivial risk that its contents will be exposed to
the general public.283
And what is the cost of saying that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects garbage on our premises, the telephone numbers we dial, and
the insides of our houses from helicopters?  I see only an insignificant
cost to legitimate law enforcement.  My narrow definition of “know-
ingly exposes” does not deny the police the option to rummage at will
through our garbage, record the phone numbers we dial inside our
home, or stare into our houses from helicopters.  It simply means the
police must have probable cause in all three cases and a warrant in the
latter two, because they involve searches of a house.284  Is that such a
draconian limitation on the police?  It is, I believe, much more in
keeping with the Fourth Amendment that the Framers created.  Of
course, it was not just suspicionless searches that drew expressions of
concern from the Antifederalists.  They were also worried that cus-
toms officials might abuse their office to obtain evidence.  I now turn
to that dimension of current Fourth Amendment doctrine.
I. Clause [3]: Other than Searches Incident to Arrest, No Searches Shall Be
Conducted on Less than Probable Cause to Believe that the Search Will
Produce Evidence of Crime
Recall Patrick Henry’s speech to the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion.  Part of Henry’s concern about a “government of force” was with
the power to search.  He wrote: “Suppose an exciseman will demand
leave to enter your cellar, or house, by virtue of his office; perhaps he
may call on the militia to enable him to go.”285  Today’s “excisemen”
are the federal and state police charged with the war on drugs.  While
the Court’s doctrine does not permit police to “demand leave to
enter,”286 the police have adopted a strategy of implied coercion that,
I believe, is the twenty-first century equivalent to a demand.
Indeed, this strategy has proved so successful that it has largely
replaced other justifications for searching a suspect such as incident
to arrest or in a Terry stop and frisk.  One police detective said that as
283 At least one state supreme court agrees that it is an unreasonable search to
open a closed, opaque trash container on the curb. See State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d
793 (N.J. 1990).
284 I assume the garbage is not on the curtilage. See supra note 241. R
285 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 122, at 412 (reporting Patrick Henry’s June 15, R
1788, remarks at the Virginia ratification convention).
286 See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
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many as ninety-eight percent of the searches he conducts are consent
searches.287  Arnold Loewy has concluded that “truly voluntary con-
sent, while perhaps not oxymoronic, certainly does not seem to be the
rule, at least according to the defendants in the litigated cases.”288
The New Jersey Supreme Court characterized police requests for con-
sent from motorists as a “widespread abuse of our existing law that
allows law enforcement officers to obtain consent searches of every
motor vehicle stopped for even the most minor traffic violation.”289
The court cited a study that found ninety-five percent of motorists
gave written consent to police after being notified of their right to
refuse consent.290
The state court noted that police have almost unchecked discre-
tion in deciding what drivers to stop—because it is “virtually impossi-
ble to drive and not unwittingly commit some infraction of our motor
vehicle code”291—and totally unchecked discretion in deciding which
drivers to ask for consent.  This discretion, of course, opens the door
to racial profiling.  As Tracey Maclin writes:
Three hundred years ago colonial officials ordered the arbitrary
seizure of both slave and free blacks for “gadding abroad” the
streets.  Before the Constitution recognized blacks as citizens of the
United States, protest against arbitrary intrusions was futile because
blacks “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”
For black motorists, things have not changed significantly.  Police
are free to target blacks for traffic seizures and use those intrusions
to initiate unwarranted criminal investigations.292
It is no exaggeration to say that the Court’s consent search doc-
trine enables racial profiling in traffic stops.  Without a consent search
doctrine, police will be far less likely to “fish” for drug suspects by
making traffic stops.  If Tracey Maclin is right that “minority persons,
particularly black men, are deemed second-class citizens in the eyes of
law enforcement,”293 it stands to reason that police will stop more mi-
nority motorists so that they can ask for consent.  Thus, although ra-
287 RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS 21 (1984).
288 Arnold H. Loewy, Cops, Cars, and Citizens: Fixing the Broken Balance, 76 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 535, 553 (2002).
289 State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 911 (N.J. 2002).
290 Id. at 910–11 (citing Monitors’ Fourth Report, Long Term Compliance Audit,
at 15 (July 21, 2001) (Civil No. 99-5970), available at http://nj.gov/lps/
monitors_report_4.pdf).
291 Id. at 908.
292 Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 392 (1998)
(quoting Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857)).
293 Id.
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cial profiling is not the only problem raised by the Court’s consent
search doctrine, the almost complete discretion it provides state
troopers certainly makes racial profiling extremely easy to accomplish
and virtually impossible to detect.  How could a driver ever prove that
the officer asked him for consent because of his race?
The New Jersey Supreme Court described categories of methods
for securing this “voluntary” consent.  One is to use “‘extended deten-
tion and questioning regarding issues not related to the reason for the
stop, such as “How much money do you have in your pocket?” and
“Why are you riding around on the New Jersey Turnpike?”’”294  A sec-
ond strategy is to use “‘intimidating statements to obtain consent to
search;’” for example “‘the drug dog’s on the way,’” and “‘once the
drug dog gets here, everybody gets arrested.’”295 A third technique is
“‘use of “hypothetical” consent requests’” such as “ ‘if I asked for con-
sent to search your car, would you sign it?’”296
A dramatic example can be seen in the facts from a recent United
States Supreme Court case, United States v. Drayton.297  Because every-
thing about consent is also about context, I quote at length from the
Court’s recitation of the facts.  Three police officers boarded a bus
as part of a routine drug and weapons interdiction effort.  The of-
ficers were dressed in plain clothes and carried concealed weapons
and visible badges.
Once onboard Officer Hoover knelt on the driver’s seat and
faced the rear of the bus.  He could observe the passengers and
ensure the safety of the two other officers without blocking the aisle
or otherwise obstructing the bus exit.  Officers Lang and Blackburn
went to the rear of the bus.  Blackburn remained stationed there,
facing forward.  Lang worked his way toward the front of the bus,
speaking with individual passengers as he went.  He asked the pas-
sengers about their travel plans and sought to match passengers
with luggage in the overhead racks.  To avoid blocking the aisle,
Lang stood next to or just behind each passenger with whom he
spoke.
294 Carty, 790 A.2d at 911 (quoting Monitors’ Fourth Report, Long Term Compli-
ance Audit at 11–12 (July 21, 2001) (Civil No. 99-5970), available at http://nj.gov/
lps/monitors_report_4.pdf).
295 Id. (quoting Monitors’ Fourth Report, Long Term Compliance Audit at 11–12
(July 21, 2001) (Civil No. 99-5970), available at http://nj.gov/lps/monitors_report_4.
pdf).
296 Id. (quoting Monitors’ Fourth Report, Long Term Compliance Audit at 11–12
(July 21, 2001) (Civil No. 99-5970), available at http://nj.gov/lps/monitors_report_4.
pdf).
297 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
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According to Lang’s testimony, passengers who declined to co-
operate with him or who chose to exit the bus at any time would
have been allowed to do so without argument.  In Lang’s experi-
ence, however, most people are willing to cooperate.  Some passen-
gers go so far as to commend the police for their efforts to ensure
the safety of their travel.  Lang could recall five to six instances in
the previous year in which passengers had declined to have their
luggage searched.  It also was common for passengers to leave the
bus for a cigarette or a snack while the officers were on board.  Lang
sometimes informed passengers of their right to refuse to cooper-
ate.  On the day in question, however, he did not.
Respondents were seated next to each other on the bus.  Dray-
ton was in the aisle seat, Brown in the seat next to the window.
Lang approached respondents from the rear and leaned over Dray-
ton’s shoulder.  He held up his badge long enough for respondents
to identify him as a police officer.  With his face 12- to-18 inches
away from Drayton’s, Lang spoke in a voice just loud enough for
respondents to hear:
“I’m Investigator Lang with the Tallahassee Police Department.
We’re conducting bus interdiction [sic], attempting to deter
drugs and illegal weapons being transported on the bus.  Do
you have any bags on the bus?”
Both respondents pointed to a single green bag in the
overhead luggage rack.  Lang asked, “Do you mind if I check
it?,” and Brown responded, “Go ahead.”  Lang handed the bag
to Officer Blackburn to check.  The bag contained no
contraband.
Officer Lang noticed that both respondents were wearing
heavy jackets and baggy pants despite the warm weather.  In
Lang’s experience drug traffickers often use baggy clothing to
conceal weapons or narcotics.  The officer thus asked Brown if
he had any weapons or drugs in his possession.  And he asked
Brown: “Do you mind if I check your person?”  Brown an-
swered, “Sure,” and cooperated by leaning up in his seat, pull-
ing a cell phone out of his pocket, and opening up his jacket.
Lang reached across Drayton and patted down Brown’s jacket
and pockets, including his waist area, sides, and upper thighs.
In both thigh areas, Lang detected hard objects similar to drug
packages detected on other occasions.  Lang arrested and
handcuffed Brown. Officer Hoover escorted Brown from the
bus.
Lang then asked Drayton, “Mind if I check you?”  Drayton
responded by lifting his hands about eight inches from his legs.
Lang conducted a patdown of Drayton’s thighs and detected
hard objects similar to those found on Brown.  He arrested
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art25
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\80-4\NDL407.txt unknown Seq: 59 12-APR-05 17:27
2005] time  travel,  hovercrafts,  and  the  framers 1509
Drayton and escorted him from the bus.  A further search re-
vealed that respondents had duct-taped plastic bundles of pow-
der cocaine between several pairs of their boxer shorts.  Brown
possessed three bundles containing 483 grams of cocaine.
Drayton possessed two bundles containing 295 grams of
cocaine.298
The district judge did not grant the motion to suppress, finding it
“ ‘obvious that [respondents] can get up and leave, as can the people
ahead of them.’”299  The judge then concluded: “ ‘[E]verything that
took place between Officer Lang and [Mr. Drayton and Mr. Brown]
suggests that it was cooperative and there was nothing coercive [or]
confrontational about the encounter.’”300
Nothing coercive?  To be sure, Officer Lang made no explicit
“demand” that Brown and Drayton permit him to search their per-
sons, yet the aroma of coercion is unmistakable.  One officer stood in
the front of the bus.  Another officer stood in the rear of the bus.  A
third officer began working his way from the back of the bus to the
front.  Though the officers testified that anyone seeking to leave the
bus could do so, on this day no one left the bus.  If you were sitting in
that bus, under police observation from front and rear, would you
think you could simply get up and leave the bus?  I doubt it.  Moreo-
ver, though Lang sometimes informed passengers of their right to re-
fuse consent, he did not inform anyone on that particular day.
Trapped on the bus, with no idea that they could refuse consent, did
Brown and Drayton experience a “demand” that they permit the
search?
Leave Brown to one side because his case is harder.  How could
Drayton be said to have voluntarily consented when he just saw what
happened when Brown “consented”?  It is plausible to think that
someone who is carrying contraband will voluntarily consent on the
ground that the officer may take the consent as proof of innocence
and decide not to search.  But having discovered contraband on
Brown, there is simply no way that the officer was going to assume that
Drayton’s consent manifested innocence.  Thus, Drayton must have
felt he had no choice.  It borders on ludicrous to say that Drayton
consented.  But the Court’s consent doctrine is so malleable that a
majority reached precisely that conclusion, indulging in what Janice
298 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197–99 (citations omitted) (quoting Joint App., Drayton
(No. 01-631)).
299 Id. at 200 (quoting Joint App. at 132, Drayton (No. 01-631)).
300 Id. (quoting Joint App. at 132, Drayton (No. 01-631)).
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Nadler calls “a fictional standard for the definitions of seizure and
voluntary consent.”301
Of course, if one defines “consent” as the lack of overt coercion,
which is ultimately what the Court has done in the Fourth Amend-
ment, perhaps Drayton makes sense.  It would not, however, have
made sense to Patrick Henry.  It seems to me that what Officer Lang
did was no different from the exciseman’s feared “demand . . . to
enter your cellar, or house, by virtue of his office.”  Henry feared that
the exciseman might “call on the militia to enable him to go” where
he pleased.  In Henry’s day, the exciseman was not armed.  Today, of
course, the state and federal police are heavily armed.  When seeking
to interdict the flow of contraband, today’s police are a combination
of exciseman and militiaman.
While one can obviously never know, I am confident that if we
described the facts of the search of Drayton to Patrick Henry, and de-
scribed the purpose of the bus interdiction and the arms carried by
police, Henry would exclaim that his worst fears had been realized.
Most citizens today probably view Officer Lang’s bus interdiction
more favorably than the Antifederalists viewed the exciseman’s search
for dutiable items.302  It is this evolution of middle America toward
fear of crime and criminals and away from fear of government that
has contributed to a steady erosion of the Fourth Amendment.  But it
is the role of the Fourth Amendment (indeed most of the Bill of
Rights) to restrain popular government behavior when it intrudes too
far into the core rights created by the Framers.  One example is the
Court’s willingness to impose what it perceived as the Framers’ “wall
of separation” between church and state even though prayer in school
and various forms of public aid to parochial schools were quite
popular.
I suppose it is more difficult to work up enthusiasm to protect
those who are carrying almost 800 grams (twenty-seven ounces) of co-
caine.  After all, atheists may challenge our belief structure, but drug
dealers threaten us and our children with addiction and death.  Yet I
cannot resist the conclusion that Drayton’s “consent” is consent only
in the most academic sense.  Defining “consent” as the lack of overt
coercion is a pretty impoverished notion when one is facing armed
police who appear to be blocking egress from a bus.  Given what we
301 Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002
SUP. CT. REV. 153, 218.
302 See, e.g., id. at 221 (noting that it might be “desirable to permit police to board
intercity buses and pose questions to passengers and, in some circumstances, conduct
searches of baggage and persons”).
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are learning about the reaction of citizens to civilian authority,303 and
remembering that the ones requesting consent in drug cases are of-
ficers who carry guns and have the power to arrest, a definition of
consent that includes every noncoerced act is unrealistic.  Moreover,
Janice Nadler raises the provocative possibility that while the police
officer perceives a friendly conversation, the suspect may perceive co-
ercion.304  So whose perspective “counts”?
The New Jersey Supreme Court held in State v. Carty 305 that, in
some situations, genuine consent is simply not possible.  The court
concluded that even a signed, written consent, as the state court had
earlier required in State v. Johnson,306 might not be “voluntary or oth-
erwise reasonable” when the state police seek that consent from a mo-
torist who has been stopped on the highway.307
What can be synthesized from a review of scholarly articles, cases
from around the country, and the empirical data referred to in this
opinion, is that despite use of the first-tell-then-ask rule or the vol-
untary and knowing standard adopted in Johnson, consent searches
following valid motor vehicle stops are either not voluntary because
people feel compelled to consent for various reasons, or are not
reasonable because of the detention associated with obtaining and
executing the consent search.  Stated differently, hindsight has
taught us that the Johnson standard has not been effective in protect-
ing our citizens’ interest against unreasonable intrusions when it
comes to suspicionless consent searches following valid motor vehi-
cle stops.308
The state court then held that a request for consent in the absence of
a reasonable and articulable suspicion309 violated the state’s version of
the Fourth Amendment.310  I have elsewhere questioned whether the
New Jersey Supreme Court went far enough to solve the problem of
“consent” that is implicitly coerced by police.311  But the state court
was right to require individualized suspicion.  My Fourth Amendment
does not say police cannot search a drug courier’s car, only that they
303 See, e.g., id. at 165–97 (summarizing the social science studies).
304 Id. at 197–201.
305 790 A.2d 903 (N.J. 2002).
306 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975).
307 Carty, 790 A.2d at 911.  Nadler agrees, relying on data from Ohio.  Nadler,
supra note 301, at 205–06. R
308 Carty, 790 A.2d at 911.
309 This is the standard from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
310 Carty, 790 A.2d at 911–12.
311 See George C. Thomas III, Terrorism, Race and a New Approach to Consent Searches,
73 MISS. L.J. 525 (2003).
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must have probable cause to do so. State v. Carty is support for my
argument.
If police had probable cause to believe that Brown (the other sus-
pect in Drayton) was a drug courier, they can arrest him and search
incident to arrest.  Once they find drugs on Brown, they surely have
probable cause to believe that Drayton is part of the drug trafficking.
They can then arrest and search him.  But when police do not have
probable cause, under my Fourth Amendment, they may not search
based on consent.
I have no doubt that if Patrick Henry saw a videotape of even run-
of-the-mill requests for consent made by armed officers who have de-
tained a person on the side of the road, he would conclude that the
“request” was a “demand” made “by virtue of his office”—that is, by
virtue of the power the officer has to detain the motorist until he is
satisfied that no “dutiable items” (contraband) are being “smuggled”
(transported) in the vehicle.  Instead, we today have a Fourth Amend-
ment that, in Arnold Loewy’s words, “seriously undervalues the secur-
ity of citizens traveling the highways.”312
To require probable cause as the only justification for a search
may seem draconian.  Yet there is no evidence of consent searches in
the colonial era.  As Thomas Clancy puts it: “One stark conclusion
should be drawn from the history preceding the Amendment and the
drafting process of the Amendment: particularly described persons,
places, or things based on individualized suspicion were considered
inherent characteristics of reasonable searches and seizures by the
framers.  Individualized suspicion was considered an element of rea-
sonableness.”313  Clancy concludes that we should follow history on
this point:
There must be a return to the central importance given to indi-
vidualized suspicion by the framers.  A reasonableness inquiry is not
an unprincipled balancing of competing interests. Rather, it is a
weighted inquiry: one starts with a conception of what reasonable-
ness is. It is, at least in part, a search or seizure based on individual-
ized suspicion that the object of the intrusion has characteristics
that justify the intrusion.314
312 Loewy, supra note 288, at 565. R
313 Clancy, supra note 37, at 632–33. R
314 Id. at 634.  Clancy does not similarly reject consent searches (he doesn’t men-
tion consent searches), leaving the way clear for me on that issue.  He does concede
that there might be exceptions to his requirement of individualized suspicion, based
on “necessity,” id., and perhaps he thinks consent searches are an appropriate excep-
tion to the individualized suspicion principle.
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What is so draconian about requiring individualized suspicion
before police can search?  Perhaps banning consent searches is draco-
nian because the war on drugs requires we allow the police to use
subtle coercion to get evidence, but I am unpersuaded.
VI. THE COURT’S COMPETING FOURTH AMENDMENT VISION
The Court has tried two approaches to Fourth Amendment inter-
pretation and is currently shifting to a third.  Neither of the first two
proved successful and the third is probably the worst of all.  The first
approach, seen in Boyd v. United States 315 and Gouled v. United States,316
had the Court privileging the privacy of books, records, and other pa-
pers.  In Boyd, the Court struck down an act of Congress that permit-
ted a United States attorney in forfeiture cases to make a motion
requiring the defendant to produce any “book, invoice, or paper” that
supported the government’s allegations.317  At that point, the defen-
dant had a choice between producing the “book, invoice, or paper” or
having his failure to produce be taken as a confession of the allegation
in the motion.  The Court made much of the privacy associated with
personal papers, concluding that the Fourth Amendment protected
against “the invasion of [the] indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property.”318
In Gouled, papers were taken from the defendant’s office under
the authority of two search warrants.319  Despite the authorization
given the officers in the search warrants, the Court held that the pa-
pers were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  The problem
the Court saw was that Gouled’s interest in his private papers was
greater than the government’s interest.  Thus, no authorization could
justify seizure of the papers.320  In the Court’s view, warrants could be
used to justify seizure of property inside a home or office
only when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found
in the interest which the public or the complainant may have in the
property to be seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when
a valid exercise of the police power renders possession of the prop-
erty by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken.321
315 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
316 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
317 116 U.S. at 620.
318 Id. at 630.
319 255 U.S. at 303.
320 Id. at 309–10.
321 Id. at 309.
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That extremely deferential approach to lawfully possessed private pa-
pers would not last.  In its place, the Court groped its way toward a
Fourth Amendment in which warrants would play a critical role.
Whether the Framers intended some kind of warrant requirement, as
Tracey Maclin concludes,322 or intended the Reasonableness Clause
to stand separate from the Warrant Clause, as Akhil Amar and Telford
Taylor claim,323 the Court began ever so tentatively to develop a war-
rant requirement in the 1940s. We have already seen that the Court
continues to be committed to a warrant requirement for searches of a
home, albeit one in which consent can replace a warrant.
But outside the home, the warrant requirement was splintering as
early as 1971.  The issue in Coolidge v. New Hampshire 324 was whether a
warrant was necessary to conduct a series of searches of the defen-
dant’s car, seized from the driveway of his home after his arrest.  The
key parts of Coolidge seeking to clarify twenty years or so of labor in the
Fourth Amendment warrant vineyard were endorsed by only four jus-
tices.325  Today, it makes nonsense of the word “requirement” to ar-
gue that a warrant requirement exists outside the home.  There is no
longer any meaningful presumption against warrantless searches con-
ducted outside the home.
Today, the Court sees the two clauses as separate, at least outside
the home, and the question of whether a search is reasonable is a
freestanding inquiry that has nothing to do with whether police
should have gotten a warrant.  In essence, the Court is developing a
common law of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.  So the road went
from the Boyd-Gouled fetishism of private papers to the warrant re-
quirement and then merged onto the autobahn of reasonableness.
The best example of this Fourth Amendment common law re-
turns us to Terry v. Ohio, where the Court explicitly tested the officer’s
conduct “by the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”326  The Framers would have un-
derstood the notion that an officer can stop a night walker to inquire
322 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Re-
view, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925 (1997).
323 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 10–11 (1997); TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTER-
PRETATION 43 (1969).  For a devastating critique of the Taylor-Amar argument, see
Davies, supra note 28, at 575–90. R
324 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
325 Justice Harlan, who provided the critical fifth vote for reversing Coolidge’s
conviction, did not join the part of the Court’s opinion most clearly setting out the
scope of the warrant requirement. Id. at 490–92. (Harlan, J., concurring).
326 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
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into his business.  And the Court did require “reasonable suspicion” to
make a forcible stop.  But it also permitted a thorough frisk of the
person based on the same standard.  This would have baffled the
Framers.  As we saw,327 Justice Douglas was also baffled that the Court
permitted the police to do on the street what a justice of the peace
could not authorize by warrant.
Is Terry open to a challenge, after almost four decades on the
books?  Perhaps.  In a thoughtful concurring opinion in Minnesota v.
Dickerson,328 Justice Scalia examined the Framing-era history and con-
cluded that the stop of a suspicious person “accords with the common
law—that it had long been considered reasonable to detain suspicious
persons for the purpose of demanding that they give an account of
themselves.  This is suggested, in particular, by the so-called night-
walker statutes, and their common-law antecedents.”329  But he found
no “precedent for a physical search of a person thus temporarily de-
tained for questioning.”330  The lack of precedent caused Justice
Scalia to “doubt . . . whether the fiercely proud men who adopted our
Fourth Amendment would have allowed themselves to be subjected,
on mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to such
indignity.”331
As Justice Scalia reads the history (and as I read the history) a
search, even a frisk, of a suspicious person on the street requires prob-
able cause.  As to the right to detain a suspicious person, Hawkins
stated the rule as “every private person may by the common law arrest
any suspicious night-walker, and detain him till he give a good ac-
count of himself.”332  Hale agreed that “suspicious night-walkers”333
could be arrested, but he cautioned that the “suspicion must not be a
mere causeless suspicion, but must be founded upon some probable
reason.”334
Whether night walkers could be detained on a lesser standard
than required for arrest for other crimes is unclear to me.  If so, then
Justice Scalia is right that the “stop” part of Terry might be consistent
with the Fourth Amendment.  If not, if the same “probable reason”
was required to detain night walkers, then Terry is flawed all the way
down.  Its authorization of a seizure on less than a magistrate would
327 See supra notes 238–39 and accompanying text. R
328 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
329 Id. at 380 (Scalia, J., concurring).
330 Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring).
331 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
332 2 HAWKINS, supra note 162, ch. 12, § 20, at 120. R
333 2 HALE, supra note 36, at *89. R
334 Id. at 89, n.f.
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require for an arrest warrant is as historically flawed as its authoriza-
tion of a search on less than probable cause.
Terry is not the only casualty of my probable cause principle.  In
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,335 the Court approved permanent
checkpoints near the border that monitor for illegal aliens by stop-
ping cars with no suspicion at all.  In Michigan Department of State Police
v. Sitz,336 the Court approved movable roadblocks to search for drunk
drivers.  These roadblock cases cannot coexist with the historic proba-
ble cause principle.  Here, I can enlist the help of Justice Thomas.  He
has raised the possibility of revisiting and overruling the roadblock
cases.  In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,337 Justice Thomas concluded
that the roadblock cases permit a narcotics roadblock.  But he offered
the following tantalizing observation:
I am not convinced that Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte were correctly de-
cided.  Indeed, I rather doubt that the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment would have considered “reasonable” a program of in-
discriminate stops of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing.  Re-
spondents did not, however, advocate the overruling of Sitz and
Martinez-Fuerte, and I am reluctant to consider such a step without
the benefit of briefing and argument.338
I think Justice Thomas is right.  The Framers would not have per-
mitted routine stops based on no suspicion at all.  Of course, to over-
rule Martinez-Fuerte is not to render the government powerless to
regulate who and what enters our country from abroad.  We would
still have the customs inspections similar to those authorized by the
Collection Acts of 1789 and 1790.
I leave for another day the issue of administrative searches
outside the context of customs searches.  The history that Justice
Frankfurter marshaled in Frank v. Maryland 339 tends to show that the
colonists permitted health and safety inspections without any showing
of cause or a warrant.340  But the question of what constitutes a health
and safety measure is immensely complex, as the Court’s labored
opinion in Ferguson v. City of Charleston341 makes plain.  The current
335 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
336 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
337 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
338 Id. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
339 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
340 Id. at 363–65.
341 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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Article is both long enough and controversial enough without adding
that headache.342
The glue holding together my proposal to revamp the Fourth
Amendment is that all seizures and all searches save the search inci-
dent to arrest must be based on individualized cause (and the search
incident to arrest will almost always in fact be justified by cause that
runs parallel to the suspicion that justifies the arrest).  The Court uses
“probable cause” as the minimum required for an arrest.  This makes
good sense because the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause
for search and arrest warrants.
The Court has far too often dispensed with the requirement of
probable cause.  I think the Framers would have looked askance at any
doctrine that permitted the police (the excisemen and the militia) to
search without having “reason to suspect.”  We saw that the First Con-
gress, acting prior to the writing and ratification of the Fourth
Amendment, permitted inspections of the contents of ships for cus-
toms violations.  Beyond that, searches of ships were permitted only
when the customs officials had “reason to suspect any goods, wares or
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed.”343  Searches of dwell-
ing houses, stores, buildings, and “other such place[s]” required
“cause to suspect a concealment” of dutiable items.344
To reject Terry and Martinez-Fuerte is to reaffirm the Framers’ view
requiring probable cause.  The principle underlying my Fourth
Amendment, therefore, is that probable cause is required for govern-
ment to perform a Fourth Amendment search or seizure.  It’s simple.
It’s profound.  It’s what the Framers would have wanted.
CONCLUSION: A “DO-OVER” FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
I think the Court’s requirement of warrants to search homes is
consistent with the Framers’ values.  Beyond that, I used the Framers’
values to test two aspects of Fourth Amendment doctrine that seem
particularly wrongheaded to me: first, the narrowing of the scope of
the Fourth Amendment by reference to expectations of privacy, and
second, the Court’s refusal to require particularized suspicion in
many cases.
342 This means I also get to avoid the difficult question posed by South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), where the Court upheld inventories of cars that have
been lawfully impounded.
343 Collection Act of 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43, repealed by Act of Aug. 4, 1790,
ch. 35, § 74, 1 Stat. 145, 178.
344 Id.
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As to the first test, I concluded (here I have lots of company)345
that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test is a failure.  It is
too malleable and in the hands of a law and order Court has pro-
duced results difficult to comprehend, or at least I think they would
be difficult for Patrick Henry and the First Congress to comprehend.
In its place, I would go back to the text of the Fourth Amendment,
like Justice Black, and ask whether the police searched the person,
house, paper, or effect of the defendant.  And I would construe forfei-
ture of my right to be secure narrowly, requiring the state to prove a
knowing exposure to the public at large.  After all, to claim that the
Fourth Amendment protects my garbage is merely to require the po-
lice to have probable cause to seize and search it.
The second radical change that follows from my historical
thought experiment is to require probable cause for all seizures and
for all searches for evidence of crime except searches incident to ar-
rest.  All the many exceptions to the Fourth Amendment that do away
with probable cause should be abolished except customs searches
and, perhaps, some administrative inspection schemes.  Some exam-
ples of doctrines inconsistent with Fourth Amendment history include
the Terry stop and frisk regime, the permanent checkpoints near, but
not on, the Mexican border, and the movable drunk driving
checkpoints.
The sturdy principle that all searches require probable cause
leads naturally to the abolition of consent as a freestanding justifica-
tion for a search.  Here the history is less clear but is at least consistent
with my position.  We see nothing in the Framing history about con-
sent searches because the proud Americans of that era would not have
understood the notion that they should surrender their property or
privacy at the request of a lowly constable.  What we do see in the
history of search and seizure is that individual cause was required
before a search could proceed.  With that principle firmly in place,
consent searches cannot pass muster.  It is a simple idea.  If police
have probable cause to search, they can search, without a warrant
outside of structures.  If police do not have probable cause to search,
they cannot search.
I have no illusion that any court anywhere will read this Article
and adopt my reconstructed Fourth Amendment.  My hope, instead,
is to stimulate a discussion among scholars and even among judges
about better ways of understanding the “right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”
345 See, e.g., Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 259. R
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